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There has been increasing interest in the transformative
power of not only cryp to-currencies like Bitcoin, but also the
technology underlying them-namely blockchain. To the
uninitiated, a blockchain is a sophisticated, distributed online
ledger that has the potential, according to Goldman Sachs, to
"change 'everything."' From making businesses more efficient to
recording property deeds to engendering the growth of 'smart'
contracts, blockchain technology is now being investigated by a
huge range of organizations and is attracting billions in venture
funding. Even the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) is investigating blockchain technology to
"create an unhackable messaging system." However, the legal
literature has largely ignored the rise of blockchain technology
outside of its finance, securities, and copyright implications.
This Article seeks to address this omission by analyzing the
potential impact of blockchain technology on advancing the
cybersecurity of firms across an array of sectors and industries
with a particular focus on certificate authorities and the critical
infrastructure context. Moreover, we examine the rise of
blockchains through the lens of the literature on polycentric
governance to ascertain what lessons this research holds to
build trust in distributed systems and ultimately promote cyber
peace.
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"Why should you care? Maybe you're a music lover who wants
artists to make a living off their art. Perhaps you're an
immigrant who's sick of paying big fees on remittances. Maybe
you're an aid worker who needs to identify landowners so you
can rebuild their homes after an earthquake. Or a citizen fed up
with the lack of transparency and accountability of politicians.
Or a social media user who thinks the data you generate might
be worth something-to you. Even as we write, innovators are
building blockchain-based applications that serve these ends.
And they are just the beginning."
-Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, authors of Blockchain
Revolution: How the Technology Behind Bitcoin is Changing
Money, Business and the World1
INTRODUCTION
There has been increasing interest in the
transformative power of not only crypto-currencies like
Bitcoin,2 but also the technology underlying them-namely
blockchain. 3 Though Bitcoin gets most of the press, blockchains
arguably enjoy the far greater potential to transform business
and potentially revolutionize cybersecurity; simply put,
according to Goldman Sachs, it could "change 'everything."' 4 To
the uninitiated, a blockchain is a sophisticated, distributed
online ledger. From making businesses more efficient to
recording property deeds to engendering the growth of "smart"
contracts and even securing medical devices,5 blockchain
technology is now being investigated by a huge range of
organizations and is attracting billions in venture funding.6
I Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, How the Technology Behind Bitcoin is
Changing Money, Business and the World, TIME (May 6, 2016),
http://time.com/4320254/blockchain-tech-behind-Bitcoin/
[https://perma.ce/6BX9-EFEA].
2 See, e.g., Luke Graham, India's Rupee Restrictions are Boosting Demand for
Bitcoin, CNBC (Nov. 15, 2016, 8:44 AM),
http://www.cnbe.com/2016/11/15/india-rupee-restriction-boost-Bitcoin-digital-
currency.html [https://perma.ce/K4VN-S6NR].
3 See Naomi Lachance, Not Just Bitcoin: Why The Blockchain Is a Seductive





5 See Asha McLean, ASX Argues Medical Records Are Ripe for Blockchain,
ZDNET (Nov. 16, 2016, 22:00 PST), http://www.zdnet.com/article/asx-argues-
medical-records-are-ripe-for-blockchain/ [https://perma.ce/BH7S-ZPNH].
6 See Kyle Torpey, Prediction: $10 Billion Will Be Invested in Blockchain
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Even the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) is investigating blockchain technology to "create an
unhackable messaging system,"7 as is IBM and Disney.8
However, the legal literature has largely ignored the rise of
blockchain technology outside of its finance, securities, and
copyright implications.9 This Article seeks to address this
omission by analyzing the potential impact of blockchain
technology on advancing the cybersecurity of firms across an
array of sectors and industries with a particular focus on
certificate authorities and the critical infrastructure context.
Moreover, we examine the rise of blockchains through the lens
of the literature on polycentric governance,10 which reflects a
blockchain's organization due to its focus on building trust in
distributed systems as a tool to promote "cyber peace.""
In 1981, during what could be considered the predawn
of the Information Age, researchers were already trying to
solve varied privacy, security, and cryptographic concerns in
the still nascent network. 12 Myriad techniques were tried, but
regardless of the proposed solution, due to the involvement by
third parties (such as credit card processors), insecurity
persisted. 13 Some proponents even became jaded; one
researcher, Nick Szabo, theorized a "God Protocol" in 1998 that
[https://perma.ce/TVN4-J6WY].
7 See Lachance, supra note 3.
8 Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Here's Why Blockchains Will Change the
World, FORTUNE (May 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/08/why-
blockchains-will-change-the-world [https://perma.cc/B9RV-MRMH].
9 Most articles to date have investigated the implications of blockchain
technology in the financial market or copyright contexts. See, e.g., Angela
Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A
Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 837, 838
(2015) (discussing the operational risks undermining the utility of
blockchains in certain financial contexts); Jeffrey E. Alberts & Bertrand Fry,
Is Bitcoin a Security?, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 1, (2015) (investigating
whether Bitcoin is a security); Nick Vogel, The Great Decentralization: How
Web 3.0 Will Weaken Copyrights, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 136,
136 (2015) (analyzing the copyright implications of Bitcoin). Even those
articles that have taken a wider view have only treated cybersecurity as an
afterthought. See Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating
Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 601 (2016).
10 See Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the
Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POLY STUD.
J. 163, 171 (2011).
11 Henning Wegener, Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE 77, 82
(Hamadoun I. Tour6 & The Permanent Monitoring Panel on Information
Security of the World Federation of Scientists, eds., 2011),
http://www.itu.int/dms pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-WFS.01-1-2011-PDF-E.pdf
[https://perma.ce/BQ6Q-HJM3] (arguing that "unprovoked offensive cyber
action, indeed any cyber attack, is incompatible with the tenets of cyber
peace").
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would designate a divine being as the trusted third party and
in so doing finally grant security to the rapidly scaling global
Internet. 14 A decade later, in the wake of the global financial
crisis, an anonymous developer known as Satoshi Nakamoto
"outlined a new protocol" that left divine intervention out the of
equation. It leveraged peer-to-peer technology using distributed
computation to create the cryptocurrency that would become
known as Bitcoin. 15 This deceptively simple innovation "set off
a spark that has excited, terrified, or otherwise captured the
imagination of the computing world and has spread like
wildfire." 16 Marc Anderssen, the co-creator of the first
commercial browser, Netscape, has called the innovation "the
distributed trust network that the Internet always needed and
never had."17 Enter the "Trust Protocol"-a technology
authenticated "by mass collaboration and powered by collective
self-interests, rather than by large corporations motivated by
profit"-that has the potential to revolutionize business and
cybersecurity across numerous contexts,18 including critical
infrastructure. Understanding the development of this
technology, along with its potentials and pitfalls, is central to
unpacking the promise of blockchains, and what-if any-
regulatory steps need to be taken to ensure that they scale
successfully.
This Article is structured as follows. Part 1 offers a
technological and historical primer on blockchains featuring
discussion of basic cryptographic principles and applications
including Bitcoin and Ethereum, a smart contracts platform.
Part 2 then focuses on applying blockchain technology to
enhancing cybersecurity with a special emphasis on certificate
authorities and critical infrastructure. Part 3 concludes the
Article with an analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of
regulating blockchain architecture and the promise of
polycentric governance to help leverage blockchain technology
to build trust and thereby promote cyber peace.
1. THE RISE OF BLOCKCHAIN AND BITCOIN: A
TECHNOLOGICAL PRIMER
Despite its popularity, it could be said that Bitcoin has a
"bad reputation" due in part to the extreme fluctuations in the
crypto-currency's value, as well as some of the uses to which it
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of demanding payment in Bitcoin for cybercriminal groups
engaged in ransomware campaigns. 20 Yet at least some of this
skepticism may, in fact, be misplaced. After all, the value of
Bitcoin was largely stable for most of 2015 at approximately
$250 before appreciating to an all-time high of more than
$1,300 in March 2017,21 while financial regulators have become
more enthusiastic about the prospects of the crypto-currency; a
case in point was the European Court of Justice's 2015 decision
to recognize Bitcoin as a currency for purposes of avoiding
Value Added Tax (VAT). 22 Perhaps the most often overlooked
aspect of Bitcoin, though, is the blockchain technology
underlying it, a technology that allows "people who have no
particular confidence in each other [to] collaborate without
having to go through a neutral central authority."23 Simply put,
according to The Economist, "it is a machine for creating
trust," 2 4 and trust is exactly what is needed if we are to secure
certificate authorities and critical infrastructure from misuse,
overuse, and abuse. First, though, before exploring the myriad
applications that blockchains can have to improve
cybersecurity, it is important to distinguish between Bitcoins
and blockchains.
1.1 Analogizing Blockchains
To uncover the genius of blockchain technology, consider
something mundane, like sending an email. When we do that
(oftentimes far too frequent) task, what we are really doing is
sending a copy of data, not the original. 25 We copy such
information all the time, but we do not copy other things, like
money. To do that, we rely on centralized institutions,
institutions in which we have some degree of trust, like banks,
governments, or even social media firms.26 But relying on
could-transform -how-economy-works-trust-machine [https://perma.ce/Q5XT-
EXX7].
20 See, e.g., Mitchell Hyman, Bitcoin A7M.- A Criminal's Laundromat for
Cleaning Money, 27 ST. THOVIAS L. REV. 296, 296 (2015).
21 See, e.g., Jonathan Garber, Bitcoin Super Spikes to an All-Time High, Bus.
INSIDER (Mar. 10, 2017, 9:05 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-
super-spikes-to-an-all-time-high-2017-3 [https://perma.ce/TVZ3-P5RX].
22 See The Trust Machine, supra note 19; Yessi Bello Perez, Bitcoin is Exempt
from VAT, Rules European Court of Justice, COINDESK (Oct. 22, 2015, 9:58
BST) [https://perma.ce/J4KT-AXNW]; Pete Rizzo, The Price of Bitcoin Just
Jumped $30 in One Hour, CoDESK (Nov. 16, 2016, 13:30 BST),
http://www.coindesk.com/price-Bitcoin-just-spiked-30-one-hour/
[https://perma.ce/SZQ9-YF7E].
23 The Trust Machine, supra note 19.
24 Id
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others to do such copying is not without its costs. We pay with
money (think banking fees), and we pay with increased
insecurity given the propensity for our information to be
hacked, be it credit cards or health records. 27 Sometimes, we
even have to pay with our privacy. Plus, such centralized
systems can actually increase inequality given that up to two
billion people around the world do not have bank accounts. 28
Enter the blockchain and one of its most popular applications
to date, Bitcoin.
1.2 How Bitcoin Works
To the uninitiated, a helpful analogy to consider when
seeking to understand Bitcoin is Napster, the early peer-to-
peer file sharing service that first went online in 1999, which in
turn inspired an entire industry of competitors. 29 Amongst its
progeny are Skype and Spotify, as well as Bitcoin. 30 Bitcoin is
not saved as a central file somewhere; instead, it is represented
by blockchain transactions, a kind of "global spreadsheet" that
leverages peer-to-peer technology to authenticate each
transaction. 31 The transparency that comes with the blockchain
being public is one of its greatest strengths. 32 Every 10
minutes, all new Bitcoin transactions are "verified, cleared, and
stored in a block" that is, in turn "linked to the preceding block,
creating a chain." 33 If these blocks do not refer to one another,
then they are invalid; these blocks are also time stamped to
further protect the blocks from being altered. 34 Similar to the
reach of the World Wide Web, in time such blockchains can
become a "World Wide Ledger of value."35
While Bitcoin involves a number of highly technical
elements, it can be understood with little technical knowledge.
The main point of Bitcoin is to replace physical currency by
simulating a giant global ledger system. Each user has




29 Richard Nieva, Ashes to ashes, peer to peer: An oral history of Napster,
FORTUNE.COM (Sept. 05, 2013) http://fortune.com/2013/09/05/ashes-to-ashes-
peer-to-peer-an-oral-history-of-napster [https://perma.cc/V9HR-Y8TA].
30 The Trust Machine, supra note 19.
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This process enables a system simulating cash by allowing
transactions, which in turn update the ledger. For example, if
Alice wishes to send Bob 5 Bitcoins (B), this can be
accomplished by first checking that Alice has at least B5 in her
ledger account and then implementing a transaction that
decreases Alice's ledger by B5, and increases Bob's by B5. In
principle, if there is a global ledger that can be easily updated
in a secure and trusted manner, we can get rid of all physical
currency (an attractive prospect to many businesses and
investors in uncertain economic times) 36 and perform all
transactions through ledger updates. Bitcoin provides a
technological method to implement such a global ledger. 37
It is also important to note that while it is conceptually
simpler to think of a ledger as storing accounts with current
balances, one can use another approach. For example, if
instead of keeping a simple table as depicted in Figure 1, one
can instead sum up the entire history of all transactions of an
individual to determine their balance, as depicted in Figure 2.
While impractical for a human in practice, it provides
semantically the same information, and is simple for computers
to process, even over very long transaction lists. It is this latter
approach that Bitcoin supports. 38
36 See Bitcoin Price Surges Beyond $675 Amid Brexit Vote, CRYPTOCOINs NEWS
(June 24, 2016), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/Bitcoin-price-surges-
beyond-675-amid-brexit-vote/ [https://perma.ce/75GT-52UC].
37 See Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 8. One major feature that physical
currency provides that seems to be absent from the above ledger scheme is
anonymity. However, note that by simply using pseudonyms in the ledger
scheme, where the mapping between individuals and pseudonyms is not
known, then the ledger scheme can also provide anonymity.
38 See How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN, https://Bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works
[https://perma.ce/2JHP-GZAK].
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Indeed, a proof of concept for how secure blockchain
technology is, and its promise in promoting cybersecurity
across a range of industries, lies in the story of Bitcoin itself.
After all, proponents have claimed that "Despite an obvious
prize and years to try, hackers have not cracked the prize.
Bitcoin has been hacker proof to date. Contrast that history
with most Global 2000 firms. No matter how big, no matter
how much money they throw at cyber security, they get
[h]acked. Regularly." 40 Though this claim has ultimately
proven to be dubious given the proven instances of Bitcoin
exchange hacks, 41 the underlying blockchain technology still
boasts numerous cybersecurity advantages. To understand the
promise (and peril) of this technology, though, a brief primer on
distributed ledgers is in order.
1.2.1 A Distributed Ledger
At its root, a blockchain is a "shared, trusted, public
ledger that everyone can inspect, but which no single user
controls." 42 The participants in a given blockchain system work
together to keep the ledger updated; it may be amended only by
strict rules and consensus. 43 For example, Bitcoin's blockchain
ledger "prevents double-spending and keeps track of
transactions continuously," which is "what makes possible a
39 In Figure 2, new transactions are place on the bottom of the ledger. Assuming
that this segment of the ledger shows all transactions that Alice, Bob, and
Dave have ever been involved with, then after these transactions Alice has
B10+B5-B7=B8, Bob has B12-B5=B7, and Dave has B3+B7=B10.
40 Bernard Lunn, Bitcoin Blockchain could Solve the Cyber Security Challenge
for Banks, DAILY FINTECH (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://dailyfintech.com/2015/10/30/Bitcoin-blockchain-could-solve-the-cyber-
security-challenge-for-banks/ [https://perma.ce/2SUB-9F3E].
41 See, e.g., Yuji Nakamura, The Wretched, Endless Cycle of Bitcoin Hacks,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-17/the-wretched-endless-
cycle-of-bitcoin-hacks [https://perma.ce/8EN6-KJ9K].
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currency without a central bank." 4 4 It has also been said that
blockchains are "the latest example of the unexpected fruits of
cryptography." 4 5 To understand why, it is necessary to include
a brief, non-technical excursion into cryptographic first
principles. For those wishing such a background in
cryptographic hash functions, digital certificates, and peer-to-
peer networking, see Appendix A. For those with a sufficient
understanding of these principles, we next turn to Bitcoin
transactions.
1.2.2 A Primer on Bitcoin Transactions
Now that we have an understanding of some of the basic
cryptographic tools used in blockchains, let us consider their
application. To anchor ourselves to a concrete protocol we use
the most famous, Bitcoin, and then discuss generalizations.
Conceptually, the Bitcoin blockchain is nothing more than a
global list of transactions that have been agreed upon via a
form of consensus by a subset of the Bitcoin community. The
transactions themselves are grouped into small lists called
transaction blocks. 46 To understand these blocks, let us begin
with a standard Bitcoin transaction, which transfers funds
from one user, Alice from Figures 1 and 2, to another, Bob. We
assume that Alice has BlO in her account. She wishes to
perform a transaction, which simply means that she wishes to
transfer some of the money in her account to another Bitcoin
user, Bob. Say she needs to send B7 to Bob. This is
accomplished by performing a send transaction that transfers
all of the money in her accounts to new recipients. Alice must
specify where this money is spent, as any money left off the
table will be given as a transaction fee to Bitcoin miners, which
will be described momentarily. Thus, Alice creates a
transaction emptying her BlO account, sending B7 to Bob, and
transferring the remaining B3 back to herself, visualized
Figure 3.
Figure 3: Bitcoin Sample Transaction
Bob B7
AAlice BI
The transaction itself is encoded as an appropriate binary bit-
string by software and is sent onto the peer-to-peer (P2P)
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See infra Figure 4 and accompanying text.
343
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network where it will be received by Bitcoin miners whose job
it is to validate transactions. We put off discussion of Bitcoin
miners for a moment to discuss several security issues that
come up with the transaction as described.
First, recall that Alice's and Bob's accounts are virtual
and that when the miners validate the transaction, all they do
is agree that it is properly formed and thus legitimate.
Consequently, there is not a single ledger space where Alice's
balance is held, nor for Bob. Rather the ledger simulates the
one in Figure 2. To determine Alice's balance, the miners go
through all of Alice's prior transactions, determine the number
of Bitcoins that have been given to her, and then subtract off
all of the coins that she has spent. Anyone can do this, because
every Bitcoin transaction that has ever been performed is
stored publicly, by design, on the Bitcoin P2P network. While it
may seem cumbersome, it is something that can be done at
least somewhat efficiently by appropriately programmed
computers, as is illustrated in Figure 4.
Fi ure 4: Hi h-Level De iction o Transaction Block
New Transaction Block
Let us now address the issue of how Bitcoin miners
validate that a transaction is legitimate. The steps involved in
this example include:
1) Ensuring that Alice, rather than a fraudulent party,
created the transaction.
2) Ensuring that Alice has the Bitcoin necessary to fund
the transaction.
3) Ensuring that there is no double spending.
We note that Alice's account name is not actually "Alice" or any
other human readable string. Rather Alice's account name is a
representation of the verification-key for a digital signature. 47
In practice, these are long strings of gibberish that represent
large numbers. 48  For example,
"1FCgBDLffB9NFVvuGK9YvVmnrB42hPDv9Q" might
47 See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
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represent one's verification key-in other words, their account.
Anyone who wants to send Alice money sends it to her
verification key, which she makes available as her account
number to anyone who requests it. When Alice goes to spend
money, she must sign her transaction with the account's
corresponding signing-key, which only she knows and keeps
private (as anyone who has access to her signing key can spend
all of the money in her account). Since digital signatures are
unforgeable, when a transaction looking to spend the money in
a given account comes in, it is first checked for a valid digital
signature; if the signature verification fails, then the
transaction is discarded as illegitimate. If, on the other hand,
the signature is valid, we know that it was sent by someone
who has the corresponding signing key, and thus technically
has spending authority.
For the second goal of ensuring that Alice has sufficient
funds, a miner goes through the history of transactions that
involve Alice and takes the difference between credits and
debits to her account name, thus determining her balance.
However, since there are many miners on a distributed P2P
network, it is possible that Alice sent four different miners
transactions-such as sending B7 each to Bob, Carol, Dave, and
Eve, in each case sending the remaining B3 back to herself. If
each miner accepted the transactions as legitimate and put
them on the transaction list, then from an initial B10, Alice is
able pay out B28 cumulatively and end up with B12 in change.
This double spending illustrated in Figure 5 leads to our third
security goal. 4 9
Figure 5: Double Spending in P2P Networks
In order to ensure that individuals do not double spend,
49 For more on double spending, see PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN:
CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING AND ECONoMics 163 (2014).
345
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we need to ensure that there is consensus about the
transactions that should be considered part of the transaction
history. Because potentially many different organizations
process transactions on the P2P network, the double-spending
problem above requires consensus between relevant parties.
Further, since any party can become a miner, there is no
guarantee that they are fair actors, and so we need to ensure
the veracity of consensus even in the presence of bad-actors.
Finally, the transaction must have distributed coordination, as
by design Bitcoin rejects any central coordinate that could
become a point of security failure.
Blockchains, the subject of this article, pose a solution.
This introduces us to the most important role that miners play.
In essence, miners provide consensus for the blockchain. They
do this through the following five steps:
1) taking as input the transactions individuals send them;
2) verifying transactions for syntactic correctness, valid
signatures, and sufficient funds;
3) pooling correct transactions into a transaction block;
4) performing a proof-of-work to legitimize the transaction
block; and
5) broadcasting the results to the community.50
Steps one and two are straightforward and have been discussed
previously. Transaction blocks in step three are a new concept,
but are relatively straightforward; when a miner receives a
transaction that is correct and passes all necessary checks, it is
automatically added to the block.5 1 The block, in turn, is simply
an amalgamation of transactions that have not been included
in the official record of approved transactions by being linked
to the previously accepted transaction blocks. 52 Each of the
transaction blocks point, via a reference, to the previous
transaction block. This forms a chain of transaction blocks (e.g.,
a blockchain), and following this chain to the original block
terminates in the Bitcoin genesis block. 53 This is the first block
of Bitcoin transactions, and the fact that the chain points to
this specific block is what distinguishes true Bitcoins from any
other group of people taking the same technology, running it,
and producing an alternate competing currency. 54 In fact,
Bitcoin developers run several alternate networks, featuring
alternate genesis blocks, to allow for testing and development
50 See, e.g., ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING
DIGITAL CRYPTOCURRENCIES 174-199 (2014).
51 See MELANIE SwAN, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR ANEW ECONOMY at x, 3-5
(2015).
52 See supra Figure 4.
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without affecting the actual Bitcoin blockchain.5 5
The question underlying step four then becomes how one
decides which transaction block to add to the official
transaction block history list. The answer is that the first
miner to present a valid proof-of-work on the transaction will
have it added to the end of the block-chain.5 6 Miners are asked
to perform a proof-of-work on a transaction block in order for it
to be added. A proof-of-work is 'memoryless,' that is, it is a
probabilistic process, and previous failures do not increase the
odds of future success. 5 7 This is important, as there is little
disincentive to accept new transactions and add them to a
transaction block while searching for a proof-of-work-adding a
transaction does not discard previous work done.5 8 The first
miner to provide such a proof updates the chain. Proofs-of-work
are set at a difficulty level such that it is fairly unlikely that
multiple miners will find proofs-of-work for their respective
blocks at the same time, or close to the same time.59
When a miner finds a valid proof-of-work for its
transaction, it announces it on the P2P network circa step
five.60 All miners who receive the new transaction will check it
for validity, that the proof-of-work is complete, and that it
attaches to the end of the current transaction chain. 61
Assuming it does, then the miners will accept this as the new
end of the blockchain. The miners then update their current
transaction blocks, remove any transaction in the block they
are currently working on that are now inconsistent (e.g.,
transactions that have already been approved, or transactions
that involve doubly spending coins with approved
transactions), and point their transaction block at the new end
of the chain. 62 However, if a miner receives a completed
transaction block that does not point to the end of the current
blockchain as the miner knows it, but which is otherwise valid
55 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Note that because of the P2P
nature of the underlying communication network, it is likely that at any
given time different miners will have different transactions in their current
transaction block. Each transaction block should locally be consistent with all
the previous transactions in previous transaction blocks, but different miners'
transaction blocks might be globally inconsistent (for example, if people are
trying to double spend). Id.
56 See infra note 271-73 and accompanying text.
57 See ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES:
A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 43 (2016).
58 See id.
59 Michael Nielsen, How the Bitcoin Protocol Actually Works, DATA-DRIVEN
INTELLIGENCE BLOG (Dec. 06, 2013) http://www.michaelnielsen.org/ddi/how-
the-bitcoin-protocol-actually-works/ [https://perma.ce/Z968-2LAP].
60 See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 131.
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(that is, it points back to the genesis block, and is constituted
by valid blocks throughout), then the blockchain is said to be
split, or "forked."63 The miner must then make a decision
about which chain it will connect to its current transaction
block. The best answer is for the miner to choose the longest
blockchain (the one with the most transaction blocks) since this
represents the larger computational effort, and thus the
support of the majority of the community. Although such forks
can happen for technical reasons, they can also result from
regulatory interventions such as different jurisdictions taking
varied approaches to blockchain management, a topic discussed
further in Part 3.64
Figure 6: A Fork in the Blockchain 65
Shorter Forked Chain
In order to ensure that finding successful proofs-of-work
for block-chains does not become too frequent-making forking
a more likely process-the blockchain protocol has a natural
moderating principle built in. The difficulties of the proofs-of-
work used in the blockchains are adaptively changed to make
63 NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 172.
64 See infra Section 3.3.
65 Two different chains extend from a given transaction block. The network now
must decide which of these forks is legitimate to arrive at shared consensus.
Not shown in Figure 6 is what happens in the case of a tie, or near tie (e.g.,
two blockchains of similar or equal length). In such an outcome, the miner
must choose one chain to follow. Although the community will only accept the
longest chain, because of communication delays and other problems it is
possible for there to be several competing chains that simultaneously are
essentially the same length. Eventually, through random processes, one will
become substantially larger than the other, and the community will coalesce
around this chain. All transaction blocks in the dropped fork are now invalid,
and ignored. Any transactions that were only approved in the deprecated
chain are now null and void. See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, Bitcoin Network
Shaken by Blockchain Fork, BITCOJN MAG. (Mar. 13, 2013, 11:14 PM EST),
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bitcoin-network-shaken-by-blockchain-
fork- 1363144448/ [http://perma.ce/2XHQ-7NXE]. When non-technical means
result in a fork, it is uncommon for blockchain forks to vary in length by more
than one block. Thus, participants in a transaction are typically cautioned to
ensure that at least three transaction blocks are confirmed as part of the
blockchain after the one including their transaction of interest. This ensures
it is highly likely that their transaction is not involved in a fork of the
blockchain that will eventually be discarded.
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the amount of time they take to solve relatively constant and
predictable, regardless of the computational power available to
the miners. That is, difficulties are made easier or harder to
ensure that they take, on average, ten minutes for anyone on
the network to come up with a valid proof-of-work. 66
Given that anyone can become a miner in this
decentralized, voluntary system, a question that naturally
arises is: what motivates the miners? Simply put, they are
paid. This is done through two methods. By design, currently
the Bitcoin network pays any successful miner a fee each time
the miner has a successful proof-of-work for a transaction-block
that gets placed into the blockchain. 67 The second is through
transaction fees. During a transaction, the payer has the
option of specifying an amount that goes to the miner, as
shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Bitcoin Transaction Fees
A\lice Bl( 10 B
LAlice B2.50
LTmnsaction B.50j
The miner includes their own verification key in the
transaction block, and upon finding a proof-of-work, all
transaction fees in the block are assumed to be added to that
account. Based on how many blocks are between the confirmed
block and the transaction block (e.g., which block has the
corresponding proof attached) miners are paid a specific rate.
Initially, miners were paid B50 for each successful proof-of
work. However, the system is built so that for every 210,000
transaction blocks that are added to the chain, the value paid is
decreased by half.68 Importantly, these are not Bitcoins that
66 NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 108. This is done by dynamically
adjusting the difficulty of the proof-of-work that is expected for a block to be
added to the chain, based on how long it has taken on average to solve
previous ones in a sliding window of time. The time involved is relevant to
computing power and energy use. By some estimates, Bitcoin mining could
consume as much energy as Denmark by 2020. See Sebastiaan Deetman,
Bitcoin Could Consume as Much Electricity as Denmark by 2020,
MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 29, 2016, 11:30 AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/bitcoin-could-consume-as-much-electricity-
as-denmark-by-2020 [http://perma.ce/C7XB-367B].
67 See How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK.COM
http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-bitcoin-mining-works/
[https://perma.cc/JAB3-ED7M].
68 Since there is a minimal fractional currency in the Bitcoin system, this
halving function implies that there eventually will be no direct payment for
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are transferred from another Bitcoin user, but rather are
spontaneously created in the system, which is the only process
by which new Bitcoins are created in the system. It is also
where the term "miner" comes from, as they mine (by doing
proofs-of-work) looking for digital gold (Bitcoins). A corollary is
that there is a fixed number of Bitcoins that can be created
under the current system, meaning that Bitcoin will eventually
be an inherently deflationary currency.
1.2.3 Anonymity
Since Bitcoin wishes to duplicate physical currency, it
needs to maintain one of its crucial property: anonymity. In
order to accomplish this, the system must account for two
important issues. First, note that one's account on the Bitcoin
network does not need to be created or verified by a central
identity, which is one reason for its popularity in cybercrime
syndicates. 69 Individuals can and do create their own digital
signing key-pairs on local computers, and the verification key is
the account number. There is no central authority where
verification keys are vetted or correlated with physical
identities. 70 The security properties of digital signatures ensure
that it is a statistical impossibility that two people end up with
the same verification key, and thus there is no concern for
collisions where multiple individuals generate the same key
and thus share the account. Further, there is essentially no
cost in generating new verification keys, so people can-and
do-generate multiple accounts and verifications keys.71 Some
go so far as to generate a new set of keys for each transaction, 72
and take countermeasures to mask their Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses so that their transactions cannot be traced. 73
miners, and all motivation for miners will come in the form of transaction
fees. NARAYANANETAL., supra note 57, at 65.
69 See RYAN Ko & KIM-KWANG RAYMOND CHOO, THE CLOUD SECURITY
ECOSYSTEM: TECHNICAL, LEGAL, BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 52-53
(2015); NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 138;.
70 See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 1.
71 Id. at 56.
72 See id.
73 In order to maintain the verification key's anonymity, it is important to
prevent the key from being linked to an identity. This precludes users from
sharing keys broadly, and from directly linking them to their identities.
However, this also means that users need to take precautions when making
transactions, as the communication channel itself might be used to establish
a connection between the identity of the user and the verification key of the
transaction. For example, a user who uses a verification key vk, and connects
directly to the P2P network with no countermeasures, is likely to have their
connecting IP address (e.g., 1.2.3.4) logged into the contacted P2P system's
audit-logs. Those can later be correlated with the reception of the transaction,
and thus the verification key may be tagged to a user's IP address. If the IP
address is static or otherwise identifies a small number of users or systems,
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However, even with these precautions, the blockchain
technology undergirding Bitcoin is vulnerable to cyberattacks,
as is discussed next.
1.2.4 Computational Attacks on Blockchains
One of the key values of blockchains is that they
represent an immutable public-ledger that is arrived at by
distributed consensus. However, as we saw in Section 1.2.2,
there are times when the blockchain can fork, and where there
are multiple possible ways the blockchain might resolve itself.
It was for this reason that users were advised to wait for three
transaction blocks to have valid proofs-of-work before viewing
the transaction as accepted. However, it may have occurred to
the observant reader that there is no technical countermeasure
preventing an adversary from attempting to insert their own
fork into blockchains and thereby delete some transactions
(e.g., those that occur after the fork on the original chain). 74 An
attacker can do this by starting to provide new transaction
blocks with valid proofs-of-work that link back to an arbitrary
transaction block in the blockchain, as opposed to the end of
the chain. If they can make this fork longer than the current
valid chain, they can-in theory-convince other miners to
accept their new fork. Let us consider this attack from two
perspectives, technical and social, before discussing its
application to blockchain cybersecurity in the certificate-
authorities and critical-infrastructure contexts.
1.2.4.1 Technical
In order to produce new proofs-of-work for a large
number of transaction blocks, an adversary will need to control
a high percentage of computational power. Specifically, they
will need enough power to produce proofs-of-work at a pace
this may de-anonymize the owner of the verification key, or at the very least
narrow the list of possible candidates. Therefore, a user who cares about
anonymity might use publicly available access points or the Tor network to
mask their connecting IP. Cf Wendy McElroy, Bitcoiners Who Use Tor Be
Warned!, BITCOJN.COM (Aug. 26, 2016), http://news.bitcoin.com/update-
bitcoiners-use-tor-warned/ [http://perma.ce/TWJ2-3PCJ]. However, many who
do not care about anonymity, such as merchants, publish their verification
keys. See, e.g., How Can I Generate API Keys for My Merchant Account?,
COINBASE (Aug. 22, 2016),
http://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/articles/1914910-how-can-i-
generate-api-keys-for-my-merchant-account [http://perma.cc/A3MG-FUMM].
74 See, e.g., Alyssa Hertig, The Blockchain Created by Ethereum's Fork is
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that is faster than the rest of the network combined. They need
to produce proofs-of-work on new transaction blocks on their
forged chain until its length is longer than the currently
accepted valid tail of the fork. Being able to produce
transaction blocks at a pace that is faster than the rest of the
mining network, in turn, implies that the adversary needs to
have more computational power than the rest of the network.
Thus, once any miner controls more than fifty percent of the
processing power of the mining network, it can in principle
dictate the transactions accepted into the ledger.75 This allows
it to act as a gatekeeper on transactions, which could have
catastrophic consequences given that such an adversary could
pick and choose transactions it liked out of the original
blockchain, and include them in its new forked chain. 76 Even if
a small number of miners controls greater than fifty percent of
the computational power, this poses the risk that they may
form an oligarchy. Historically, there is precedent for miners
policing themselves to ensure that there is diversity in the
concentration of the computational power of the network.77 In
practice, though, there is more concern that an individual or
small group that controls more than fifty percent of the
computational power will be able to modify the recent history of
the blockchain as opposed to previous arbitrary points due to
social aspects, as discussed next.
1.2.4.2 Social
Any attempt to modify a large history of the blockchain
is likely to run into non-technical issues. Namely, the miners
are still individuals and groups with social norms and
expectations, which are discussed further in Part 3. Thus,
while typical miners operate automated systems that
automatically validate transactions based on algorithmic rules,
they can and will make exceptions. For example, should all of
the miners be flooded with a new tail to the blockchain that
invalidated large numbers of previous blocks, causing a fork,
then there would be significant social pressure to ignore this
fork in the blockchain. Because many of the miners would lose
the financial rewards (both transaction fees and mined coins)
for their efforts in previous mining, not to mention the
consumers and merchants who would object to their previous
transactions being invalidated, miners could socially agree to
75 See, e.g., Fran Berkman, What Is a 51 Percent Attack, and Why Are Bitcoin
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manually prevent the specified fork from being added. Yet, in a
scenario where everyone agreed to ignore such a fork (or
transaction block), actors might still worry unless the mining
network was confident that it had, at that point, increased its
mining power such that it again represented more than fifty
percent of the computing power-or the problem might very
well repeat itself. Already, there has been at least one occasion
where a blockchain community has largely agreed through
social mechanisms to ignore a given fork or transaction block. 78
1.3 Viewing Blockchains as Computational Engines
While blockchains have now been explained in the
context of basic Bitcoin transactions, it is worth discussing the
fact that blockchains are capable of generalizing to perform
more complicated tasks than the simple transactions already
explained. In fact, the programming language Script allows one
to engineer more complicated transactions, such as those that
require multiple people to sign off on a transaction, or require a
transaction to only be valid if certain conditions are met.7 9 In
practice, a common requirement is for multiple signatures to be
required for a Bitcoin to be spent, adding a check against theft
and fraudulent spending.8 0 In theory, more complicated
contracts are possible, too, although not all of the Script
language is fully supported by most miners, making it less
clear which contracts can be supported. For example, in theory,
Alice can make a transaction whereby she pays Bob some
number of Bitcoins on the condition that Charlie pays Alice.
Alice can send this transaction directly to Bob who can then
hold it until he sees a payment from Charlie to Alice
materialize on the blockchain. At that point, Bob can submit
Alice's previously created transaction to the miners for
validation.
In any event, the fact that transactions can easily be
shown to be more complicated allows us to see that the
blockchain is duplicating a distributed computation. One can
imagine everyone s accounts as the base state, and a
transaction that moves value from one account to others as a
state modifying transition function. Those familiar with
computing will realize that this represents a computational
device. Here, the power of the computational device is
dependent on the complexity of the transition functions that
can be written. Bitcoin has purposefully limited the complexity
of the transactions that can be created to prevent certain
78 See id.
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attacks on the system, but the concept is clear-blockchains
can, in theory, become distributed computers that can handle
any computation a regular computer would (although
potentially much more slowly). This leaves open the possibility
for many other uses of blockchains, such as using them to
encode small programs that move assets around-in less
technical terms, providing a platform for smart contracts.
Indeed, as with blockchain technology generally, the
myriad applications that this technology affords have received
unsatisfactory attention in the legal literature to date.81 That
omission is somewhat surprising given the claims by new
market entrants such as Ehtereum, which is a startup
blockchain platform provider through which "anyone can set up
a node that validates, observes and submits transactions." 82
This technology intersects with the law insofar as Ethereum
users can use the platform to "create arbitrary contracts which
can be used in a permisionless or permissioned group of users,"
contracts that can also make use of the digital "Ether" currency
to theoretically make enforcement automatic. 83 Yet Ethereum
also has its critics, 84 opening the door for new entrants and
cybersecurity applications, some of which are discussed next in
Part 2.
2. APPLYING BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE
CYBERSECURITY
Myriad methods and business plans have been created
to leverage the promise of blockchain technology to build trust
and enhance cybersecurity across systems, networks, and
sectors. Even Walmart is experimenting with the technology to
enhance food safety. 85 As noted above, though, this is a
movement that has largely been ignored by the legal literature.
Although a comprehensive review of the state of play in this
81 See Isaac Pflaum & Emmeline Hateley, A Bit of a Problem: National and
Extraterritorial Regulation of Virtual Currency in the Age of Financial
Disintermediation, 45 GEO. J. INTL L. 1169, 1180 n.47 (2014) (collecting
sources on the expansion of blockchain technology beyond money).
82 Marin Bartlam & Mikaela Kantor, Can Blockchain Live up to the Hype?,
JDSUPRA (July 28, 2016), http://www.j dsupra.com/legalnews/can-blockchain-
live-up-to-the-hype-57369/ [http://perma.cc/YY5P-ZP35].
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Jon Reed, Building Blockchain Apps for the Enterprise-a Q/A with
Victor Wong, DIGINOMICA (June 28, 2016),
http://diginomica.com/2016/06/28/building-blockchain-apps-for-the-enterprise-
a-qa-with-victor-wong/ [http://perma.ce/N2E5-NZ9W] (interviewing a
company represeneative who "provides the tools to develop apps on
Ethereum [.]").
85 See Jon Fingas, Walmart Tries Using Blockchain To Take Unsafe Food off
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burgeoning field is beyond the scope of this Article, we offer a
snapshot to help provide some context and then dive into a case
study unpacking the promise of using blockchains to secure
certificate authorities in an effort to enhance the cybersecurity
of critical infrastructure.
2.1 Blockchains and Cybersecurity
Examples abound regarding how firms are using
blockchains to enhance cybersecurity; after all, at its most
basic level, it is an open-source code that can be downloaded
and run by anyone for free. 86 Due to these exceedingly low
barriers to entry, this technology has the potential to unleash
'coinless' cybersecurity applications. Already, Marc
Andreessen, a venture capitalist, has invested more than fifty
million dollars in blockchain technologies. 87
At its root, blockchains allow industries, and the
Internet more generally, to return "to a decentralized Internet .
. . [but this] will only happen when it becomes accepted that
decentralized is safer than centralized."8 8 The issue, or so its
proponents maintain, is maximizing distribution in a
cybersecurity era in large part defined by centralization.8 9 To
the finance industry in particular, accustomed to building walls
and safes, this change in mindset to decentralization can be a
difficult sale. But if the sale is made, then banks in particular
could have the benefit in ways ranging from reduced server and
personnel costs to better informed decision-making.90
Indeed, while Bitcoin may be described as "a brilliant
solution looking for a problem to solve,"91 the underlying
technology of blockchains have immediate applicability across
myriad industries and sectors that could help better address
the multi-faceted cyber threat facing the finance industry, a
threat that has even been called "systemic."92 The tamper-proof
power of blockchains-so long as no single entity controls more
than fifty- percent of the computing power on the network-is
also powerful given the extent to which the cryptographic
principles introduced in Part 1, which are designed for
information security, are also "paradoxically, . . . a tool for open
86 Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 8.
87 Misha Tsukerman, The Block is Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin
Regulation and Suggestions for the Future, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127,
1144 (2015).
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dealing."93 Indeed, the bonanza could be so great that some
startups are already working on small-scale blockchain search
engines, a task made easier given the fact that "blockchain
enables radical transparency a lot easier than it enables radical
anonymity." 94 Although no blockchain has yet scaled to the
extent necessary to search the entire Web, theoretically such
engines enjoy the benefit of being able to search not only at one
point in time, but also over time, meaning that blockchains
could "add the additional dimension of time" more easily to
queries.9 5 For example, it is possible to research the first
Bitcoin transactions, to trace an individual coin back to the
first time it changed hands-famously, in the case of Bitcoin,
that was a pizza order costing 10,000 Bitcoins, which as of
November 2016 would be worth more than $7 million. 96 One
day, recruiters may even be able to search for applications from
a publicly available blockchain featuring the relevant
qualifications, and potentially foregoing extraneous
information (such as age, sex, or national origin), and, for that
matter, serendipity.97 Similar outcomes could be in the works
for the multi-billion dollar Internet marketing industry; in
short, "you'll be paying customers to listen to your elevator
pitch, but you will have tailored your query to pitch only to a
sharply defined audience so that you will be reaching exactly
the people you want to reach without invading their privacy,"
an idea called "black box marketing."98
One application that is gaining some traction, for
example, is to create secure public databases, such as for land
registries with countries such as Honduras and Greece already
expressing interest.99 The same can be done for the ownership
of anything valuable, from rare artworks to luxury goods to
93 The Trust Machine, supra note 19; Theodore Kinni, Tech Savvy: How
Blockchains Could Transform Management, MIT SLOAN MAN. REV. (May 12,
2016), http://sloanreview.mit. edu/article/tech-savvy-how-blockchains-could-
transform-management [https://perma.ce/VG9V-DAMZ] ("Now imagine the
opportunities that arise from the ability to search the World Wide Ledger, a
decentralized database of much of the world's structured information. Who
sold which discovery to whom? At what price? Who owns this intellectual
property? Who is qualified to handle this project? What medical skills does
our hospital have on staff? Who performed what type of surgery with what
outcomes? How many carbon credits has this company saved? Which
suppliers have experience in China? What subcontractors delivered on time
and on budget according to their smart contracts? The results of these queries
won't be resumes, advertising links, or other pushed content; they'll be
transaction histories, proven track records of individuals and enterprises,






99 The Trust Machine, supra note 19.
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securities.1 00 In many ways, blockchains can fulfill the function
of a notary (or as discussed below, a certificate authority), and
be applied in any context in which trust is essential; which, in
this day and age, is most of the time. In such scenarios, miners'
incentives are defined by the application in question, but can
often be covered by transaction fees. Thus, just as now, when
one pays transaction fees for purchasing land, or luxury goods,
part (or all) of that fee would be used to incentivize miners on a
blockchain to process and record the transaction. It is worth
noting that in these scenarios no "coins" need to be produced.
Indeed, financial firms are amongst those most
enthralled by the power of blockchain technology given the fact
that this would relieve them from having to have a private,
centralized (and hence vulnerable) internal ledger for which
each transaction must be checked against the records of a
counterparty. 101 Some estimates place the total amount that
this could save the banking industry at roughly $20 billion by
2022; in fact, twenty-five banking firms have already joined a
blockchain startup called R3 CEV to develop common
standards and further catalyze the industry.102 NASDAQ has
also announced its intention to begin trading the securities of
private firms using blockchains. 103 Yet some of the greatest
potential for this technology may lie in its ability to mitigate an
ongoing threat to the Internet generally, and critical
infrastructure in particular-strengthening certificate
authorities. 104 It is to that topic that we turn to next.
2.2 The Insecurity of Certificate Authorities
Certificate authorities are third parties that companies
and website owners use to identify individuals or organizations
and tie their identities to public cryptographic keys.105 This
allows users that trust the certificate authority to later trust
that an arbitrary public key received over the Internet (or some
other communication channel) belongs to the appropriate
party, and therefore messages from it correspond to the





104 See, e.g., Peter Loshin, Mozilla to Drop WoSign as a Trusted Certificate
Authority, TECHTARGET (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/450400087/Mozilla-to-drop-
WoSign-as-a-trusted-certificate-authority [https://perma.ce/7MYZ-R3BC].
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rough metaphor, if one received a text message from an
unknown number asking you to send it some confidential
information on an upcoming business transaction with the
person claiming that they are a known and eligible recipient of
said information, you would be rightly hesitant to send the
requested data.107 However, if a trusted confidant (acting in the
role of the certificate authority) assured you that the unknown
number corresponds to the individual in question, you would be
more likely to comply and send the information. The metaphor
breaks down, though, because one never meets a CA in the real
world; rather, your computing infrastructure is built trusting a
large number of them by default. In fact, the typical browser
will trust hundreds of CAs from around the world, with some of
that trust being misplaced, opening the door to cyber attacks.108
Unfortunately, due to reasons varying from simple
mishaps to clandestine government intervention, certificate
authorities are sometimes not themselves trustworthy. 109
Firms, including Google and Mozilla, have implicitly trusted
these certificate authorities even though they can lie about
users' identities or be hacked, resulting in an attacker
obtaining false certificates. 110 For example, in early 2011,
nearly 200 different certificate authorities fulfilled Mozilla
policies and thus could be used to find websites on Firefox,
including the China Internet Network Information Center
(CNNIC), which is run by the Chinese government.' In mid-
2011, fraudulent certificates were obtained from the servers of
Comodo, a popular certificate authority that creates certificates
for the likes of Gmail and Yahoo! Mail, allegedly by an Iranian
hacker. 112 But these attacks are just the tip of the iceberg. The
107 Cf Rees Johnson, Techniques, Lures, and Tactics to Counter Social




108 See, e.g., Richard Chirgwin, Google Publishes List of Certificate Authorities it
Doesn't Trust, REGISTER (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/03/23/google now publishing-a list of cas
it doesnt trust/ [https://perma.cc/5Q92-EZX3].
109 Interview with Chris Palmer, Google engineer and former technology
director, Electronic Frontiers Foundation, in San Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 25,
2011).
110 See, e.g., Danny O'Brien, The Internet's Secret Back Door, SLATE (Aug. 27,
2010),
http:E : ]www.slate.com D articles] technology[ webhead] 20100108E the-intern
ets secret back door.html [https://perma.ce/GL3N-SWC6 ] (reporting on the
vulnerabilities created by these certificate authorities).
111 See Add China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) CA Root
Certificate, Bugzilla@Mozilla, https:E : bugzilla.mozilla.orgl
[https://perma.ce/2VCE -2R2G]; Mozilla Included CA Certificate List, MOZILLA,
http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/included/
[https://perma.ce/D3AK-6UGK ] (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
112 See Peter Bright, Another Fraudulent Certificate Raises the Same Old
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Stuxnet attack was enabled, at least partially, by certificate
authorities in Taiwan that signed off improperly on identities,
which is believed to have been caused by clandestine
government interference. 1 13 Beyond the business context, the
vulnerabilities in certificate authorities hold the promise of
making critical infrastructure less secure. This is because an
increasing amount of critical infrastructure is being connected
to the Internet, opening the door to blockchain applications to
improve security. 1 14
2.3 Leveraging Blockchains to Enhance the Security
of Certificate Authorities
One of the problems with current Certificate Authorities
is that ultimately the issuances of certificates that bind real
world identities to digital signing keys involves people.
Therefore, whether due to untrustworthiness, malfeasance,
incompetence, or some combination thereof, certificates get
issued that improperly bind identities to keys. For example,
certificate authorities in Turkey have issued certificates that
bind Google's identity to keys that do not correspond to it,
allowing users to connect to sites that they believed were
Google, but were in fact a third party. 115 In theory, an
individual can check which CA signed the certificate in
question, and then verify for unusual or changed CA's (in fact,
this is how the issue with the Turkey issuance was eventually
made public),116 but even most security experts do not take the
effort to check for such changes due to time and resource
constraints.117 Perhaps unsurprisingly then, the fake issuance
of Google's certificate is not an isolated case, but similar issues
Questions About Certificate Authorities, ARsTECHNICA (Aug. 29, 2011),
http:E Karstechnica.comE security- 2011] 08] earlier-this-year-an-iranian
[https://perma.ce/QH9H-FPQC]; Ms. Smith, Chrome, Firefox, IE to Block
Fraudulent Digital Certificate, NETWORKWORLD (Jan. 4, 2013),
http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/chrome-firefox-ie-block-
fraudulent-digital-certificate [https://perma.ce/YEN9-UKVJ].
113 See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1032
(2014).
114 See Taylor Armeding, How Much at Risk is the U.S.'s Critical Infrastructure?,
CSO (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.csoonline.com/article/3024873/security/how-
much-at-risk-is-the-uss-critical-infrastructure.html [https://perma.ce/Q664-
95XG].
115 Sean Gallagher, Turkish Government Agency Spoofed Google Certificate




117 See, e.g., How Cybercrime Exploits Digital Certificates, INFOSEC INST.,
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/cybercrime-exploits-digital-certificates/
[https://perma.ce/4TLV-XXFZ] (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).
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have plagued Microsoft 18 and many other firms.119 In some
cases, CA's had so many issues with properly issuing
certificates that software companies have refused to recognize
any certificate they issue. 120
Blockchains provide a technology to circumvent the
problems of accidental issuance exactly because they represent
a large immutable public ledger. The goal now is to insert
users' and organizations' certificates into the public ledger,
rather than relying on potentially nefarious third parties. The
non-malleability and public nature of blockchains allow one to
publicly post their certificates without the need for validation
by a CA. 121 Moreover, certificates can be long-lived on the
blockchain, meaning that the issuance of new certificates for
the same organization on the blockchain can be questioned and
subject to specific criteria to ensure the risk of its use is
minimal. 122 When a certificate user trusts that a given
certificate is legitimate, it can invest computational effort as a
miner to add weight that the certificate is indeed legitimate.
For example, every time a user makes a connection to Amazon
using an encrypted channel through their browser, they can
expend some computational effort to validate Amazon's
certificate, and have this recorded in the blockchain.
Frequently used, and long lived certificates will be viewed as
more trusted than newly issued certs that are infrequently
used. This is because there would be significantly more proofs-
of-work for such long-lived, well used certificates, than for
newly issued ones. However, this makes it difficult for well-
established brands to produce new high-confidence certificates
when needed, as they will have to develop their own history.
Some ability to transitively share trust across certificates may
allow one to rectify this problem.
Similarly, users can be warned that the identity is
118 Lucian Constantin, Microsoft Revokes Trust in Certificate Authority Operated




119 Chris Paoli, Microsoft Issues Advisory to Block Spoofed Google and Yahoo
SSL Certs, REDMOND MAG. (July 11, 2014),
http://redmondmag.com/articles/2014/07/10/block-spoofed-ssl-certs. aspx
[https://perma.ce/53K2-HBEV].
120 Dominique Rafael, Firefox to Block Chinese Certificate Authority for Failed
Security Practice, ACMETECH (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.ssl2048.com/connect/firefox-to-block-chinese-certificate-
authority-for-failed-security-practice/ [http://perma.cc/AV7V-JMGD].
121 See Patricio Robles, Can the Blockchain Replace SSL?, PROGRAMMABLE WEB
(Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.programmableweb.com/news/can-blockchain-
replace-ssl/analysis/2015/03/17 [http://perma.ce/PL7V-2MF9].
122 MIT researchers have done some of the most cutting-edge work in this field.
See Digital Certificates Project, MIT, http://certificates.media.mit.edu
[https://perma.c/6FMS-KY3Q] (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).
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newly minted, and thus take appropriate precautions. There
are several technical and security demands that any such
scheme would have to satisfy in the critical infrastructure
context and otherwise, but important headway is being made,
including by scholars at MIT. 123
2.4 Application to Critical Infrastructure
"Critical infrastructure" has become an issue of
widespread concern, from vulnerable power grids to election
systems. 12 4 Worldwide, many countries are issuing new laws
and policies to secure their critical infrastructure even as they
struggle to define what should be considered "critical." But the
line between critical and non-critical is difficult to draw and is
often in the eye of the beholder, 1 2 5 though one factor that binds
many of these systems together is their mutual reliance on CAs
as discussed above. 12 6
The task of securing critical infrastructure is daunting,
and only seems to be becoming more so. Cyber attacks on U.S.
Central Command, Estonia, Georgia, and Iran, among many
other incidents, have intensified concerns that hostile foreign
governments or non-state actors could preemptively launch
cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, including companies
that support energy distribution, telecommunications, and
financial services. 12 7 An array of U.S. natural gas pipeline
companies and nuclear power plants were reportedly hit in
2013 alone. 128 Because modern societies - as well as large and
123 See id.
124 See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT
To NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 70 (2010); Scott J.
Shackelford at al., Making Democracy Harder to Hack: Should Elections be
Classified as 'Critical Infrastructure?', - MICH. J. OF L. REF. - (forthcoming
2017).
125 What is Critical Infrastructure, DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-
infrastructure [http://perma.ce/WG5Z-WA5W] (last visited Jan. 16, 2014);
What is the ICS-CER TMission?, ICS-CERT, http://ics-cert.us-
cert. gov/Frequently-Asked-Questions [http://perma.ce/2THE-PTGT] (last
visited Jan. 17, 2014) (The U.S. Cyber Emergency Response Team, which is
part of DHS, identifies sixteen critical infrastructure sectors consistent with
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, including: agriculture, banking
and finance, chemical, commercial facilities, dams, defense industrial base,
drinking water and water treatment systems, emergency systems, energy,
government facilities, information technology, nuclear systems, public health
and healthcare, telecommunications, and transportation systems).
126 See supra Part 2.3.
127 See, e.g., Researchers Warn of New Stuxnet Worm, BBC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2011),
http:E : www.bbc.co.ukE newsE technology- 15367816 [https://perma.ce/MX8A-
QRHG ] [hereinafter New Stuxnet] (reporting on the Duqu exploit and its
capacity to attack firms that manufacture industrial control systems).
128 David Goldman, Hacker Hits on U.S. Power and Nuclear Targets Spiked in
2012, CNN MONEY (Jan. 9, 2013 1:41 PM EST),
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small companies - rely heavily on networked systems and IT to
do tasks like payroll, inventory tracking, and research and
development, even small-scale cyber operations have the
potential to disrupt services and harm public welfare, 1 2 9
whereas more substantial exploits could cause paralysis, or
worse. 130 According to Professors Christopher Joyner and
Catherine Lotrionte, "Western societies have spent years
building information infrastructures [in ways] that are
interoperable, easy to access and easy to use." 13 1 Yet the open
philosophy of this system is also its Achilles' heel because one
infected system can compromise an entire network.
U.S. power systems may become more vulnerable to
cyber attacks because of the rise of Internet-connected smart
grids called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) networks.132 Useful for enhancing efficiency and
promoting distributed renewable power, such industrial control
systems can increase the cyber threat to critical
infrastructure.1 33 One senior U.S. military source has said, "[I]f
any country were found to be planting logic bombs on the grid,
it would provoke the equivalent of the Cuban missile crisis."1 34
."135 But there is no verifiable public data on how many logic
http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/09/technology/security/infrastructure-
cyberattacks [https://perma.ce/Z5ZN-YGT2] (reporting that " [t]he number of
attacks reported to a U.S. Department of Homeland Security cybersecurity
response team grew by 52% in 2012" to 198).
129 See Christopher C. Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information Warfare as
International Coercion: Elements of a Legal Framework, 12 EUR. J. IN LL.
825, 829-30 (2001); John Reed, The White House: Cyber Attacks Against
Critical Infrastructure Are Way Up, FP NAY L SEC. (May 24, 2013),
http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/24/the white house cyber a
ttacks against critical infrastructure-are way up [https://perma.cc/5GTZ-
CY5L].
130 See Cybersecurity Today and Tomorrow: Pay Now or Pay Later, COMPUTER
Sci. & TELECOMM. BD., NAT. RES. COUNCIL 3 (2002).
131 Joyner & Lotrionte, supra note 129, at 826.
132 See, e.g., Dana A. Shea, Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the
Terrorist Threat, CONG. RES. SERV.: RL31534 at 1-2 (2003), available at
https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31534.pdf [https://perma.ce/FDL9-6JGU]; Elinor
Mills, Just How Vulnerable is the Electrical Grid?, CNET (Apr. 10, 2009),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10216702-83.html [http://perma.cc/XLP2-
Z9XQ].
133 See Kim Zetter, Report: Critical Infrastructures Under Constant Cyberattack
Globally, WIRED (Jan. 28, 2010),
http:E ]www.wired.com E threatlevel] 20100 01Ecsis-report-on-cybersecurity
[https://perma.ce/VZ6X-MVHW].
134 COMMITTEE ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND
DEVELOPING OPTIONS, PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING
CYBERATIACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S.
POLICY 140 n.15 (2010).
135 COMMITTEE ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND
DEVELOPING OPTIONS, U.S. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON
DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS
FOR U.S. POLICY 140 n. 15 (2010) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON DETERRING
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bombs exist, who planted them, and what the legal, economic,
or political ramifications might be if they were ever used. 136
From GhostNet to Stuxnet and its progeny, cyber weapons have
evolved from being considered a supporting component in
military operations to systems that are capable of causing
actual damage in the real world, including to critical
infrastructure.1 37 US-CERT has estimated that a significant
cyber intrusion occurs every five minutes and that the number
of attacks on critical infrastructure jumped some 2,000 percent
from 2009 to 2011,138 while Trend Micro has determined that
new pieces of malware are being created at the rate of two per
second. 139 In the United States, according to a McAfee report,
U.S. "Critical infrastructure owners and operators report that
their networks and control systems are under repeated
cyberattack, often by high-level adversaries [such as foreign
governments]." 140 The consequences of such attacks are
potentially devastating. For example, a report by the U.S.
Cyber Consequences Unit estimates losses from a major attack
on U.S. critical infrastructure at roughly $700 billion. 141 As
CYBERATIACKS].
136 Part of the reason for this state of affairs is that the United States has more
than 3,200 independent power utilities, unlike Germany, for example, which
has four major providers. See U.S. DEP'T ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC
UTILITIES, DEREGULATION, AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS
V. 2.0, at 2.1 (May 2002); CHRISTIAN SCHOLKE, THE EU's MAJOR ELECTRICITY
AND GAS UTILITIES SINCE MARKET LIBERALIZATION 130 (2010). Some U.S. firms
are taking appropriate steps to secure their systems, but differences in
resources and expertise makes the uptake of best practices haphazard. See
Letter from Michael Assante, NERC Vice President and Chief Security
Officer, to Industry Stakeholders (Apr. 7, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/CIP-002-Identification-
Letter-040609.pdf [https://perma.ce/4LMK-TLJ2] (discussing designating
critical cyber assets).
137 See THOMAS RID, CYBER WAR WILL NOT TAKE PLACE 37-38 (2013); DAVID E.
SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA'S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING USE
OF AMERICAN POWER ix-xi (2012); Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S.
Debated Cyberwarfare in Attack Plan on Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-
was-debated-by-us.html [https://perma.cc/UZF7-V8MS].
138 See Amber Corrin, Cyber Incident Reports Skyrocket Over Three- Year Period,
FCW (July 2, 2012), http://few.com/articles/2012/07/02/ics-cert-report-cyber-
attacks-skyrocket. aspx [https://perma.ce/YUR2-K97Y].
139 See Dan Dunkel, Finding the Cure for Cyber Blindness & Missed
Opportunities, SDM (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.sdmmag.com/articles/88361-
finding-the-cure-for-cyber-blindness-missed-opportunities
[https://perma.ce/3QDM-JU5W].
140 IN THE CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR,
McAFEE:ICSIS 1 (2009),
http://iom.invensys.com/EN/pdfLibrary/McAfee/WP McAfee In The Crossfir
e_03-10.pdf [https://perma.ce/7RSK-ZCJZ].
141 See JAYSON M. SPADE, INFORMATION AS POWER: CHINA S CYBER POWER AND
AMERICAS NATIONAL SECURITY 26 (Jeffrey L. Caton ed., 2012) (citing Eugene
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such, critical infrastructure cybersecurity has become a central
component of U.S. national security, requiring innovative
solutions that mitigate the multi-faceted cyber threat from the
bottom up, including with regards to CAs and blockchain
deployment.
To take one example of the innovation now underway,
Guardtime, a cybersecurity firm, is using blockchain
technology to secure Britain's power grid, including its nuclear
power plants and flood defenses, in collaboration with a startup
accelerator, Future Cities Catapult. 142 Guardtime distinguishes
its approach to using blockchain in defense of critical
infrastructure by leveraging a technology known as Keyless
Signature Infrastructure (KSI). 14 3 This system "relies on the
integrity of the hash function to ensure [the] integrity of data"
permitting the efficient confirmation of blockchain timing,
attribution, and authentication. 144 Deploying this technology in
the critical infrastructure context has the potential to avoid
compromises such as those taken advantage of in Stuxnet. 1 4 5
In particular, KSI makes it possible to detect
"unauthorized changes in software configurations [by] . . .
providing a complete chain of the history of the data that is
generated and transmitted." 14 6 Guardtime's KSI blockchain
technology is already being deployed to help protect critical
infrastructure in Estonia, which is pioneering the use of
blockchains to do everything from register marriages to
organize health records. 147 It even promises to overcome new
technologies that promise to be a boon to both attackers and
defenders, such as quantum computing. 148 Most importantly,
KSI is distinguished by the fact that it does not rely on CAs
and the security issues they raise. 149 Among other features,
blockchain technology is mathematically provable, and a
relatively simple revocation solution.150 In practice this can be
used to record critical operations, network, and even operating
code on the ledger. Thus any attempt by attackers to modify
Habiger, Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism: The Need for a New U.S.
Strategic Approach, CYBER SECURE INST., Feb. 1, 2010, at 15-17).
142 See Jamie Holmes, Blockchain For Cybersecurity: Protecting Infrastructure,




144 See id. For more on KSI technology, see KSI Blockchain Technology,
GUARDTIME, https://guardtime.com/ksi-technology [https://perma.cc/A4UQ-
KC6R?type=image].
145 See INFOSEC INST., supra note 117.
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critical data stored on the ledger will be easily found unless
attackers are willing to exert extreme computational costs.
Similarly, code in critical systems and all approved patching
and updating can be stored on the ledger, and the code running
in critical systems can be continuously measured against what
is recorded in the block-chain. Deviation between the two
measurements provides strong evidence for the inclusion of
malware on the critical system.
Another firm, BitMesssage, is creating an open-source
platform based on "Bitcoin's block-and-transfer system to
decentralize and automate encrypted communication." 15 1 This
allows for "transactional mixing," which makes eavesdropping
difficult, thereby securing communication lines and allowing
defenders to more effectively mitigate cyber risk. 152 The system
can also handle a massive amount of Exabyte-scale data while
allowing customers to retain privacy through one-way hash
functions introduced in Part 1.153 Similar innovations are
underway in the critical infrastructure context of healthcare,
particularly with regards to using blockchain technology to
safeguard patient data. 1 54
MIT researchers have developed another product called
Enigma, which was designed "to create a marketplace where
users can sell the rights to encrypted data without providing
access to the underlying data itself." 155 Although its ultimate
impact remains to be seen, the project has the potential
guarantee that each packet of data is "masked, random, and..
secure." 15 6 If this technology is indeed perfected and rolled out
to a mass audience, it would have widespread implications for
critical infrastructure security. For example, banks would "be
able to store, analyze, and share data" on its customers and
investments anonymously. Similarly, healthcare firms would
be able to "scan genomic databases for candidates" while
guaranteeing "privacy and autonomous control." 15 7 But as with
any new technology, especially one potentially as disruptive as
blockchains, the question arises as to whether, and what kind,
of regulation may be needed to ensure that the trust
engendered by blockchains is not misplaced. A related question
centers on whether such regulation is efficient or indeed even




154 See Megan Molteni, Moving Patient Data is Messy, but Blockchain is Here to
Help, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/moving-
patient-data-messy-blockchain-help/ [https://perma.ce/5EDA-TZW6].









3. A ROLE FOR REGULATION AND THE PROMISE OF A
POLYCENTRIC BLOCKCHAIN ARCHITECTURE
This final Part builds from the technological primer of
Part 1, along with the application section from Part 2, by
considering various approaches to blockchain regulation
drawing from the work of regulatory modalities pioneered by
Professor Lawrence Lessig, among others. 15 8 Following that,
the literature on polycentric institutional analysis is introduced
in order to provide a frame for examining multi-level
governance options to enshrine cybersecurity best practices in
blockchain providers before concluding with implications for
managers and policymakers.
3.1 Unpacking the Blockchain Regulatory Landscape
As with any new technology, it is important for
regulators to wait until its benefits (and faults) have been
uncovered before moving to legislate best practices. 159 If history
is any guide, including in the P2P context, "it is likely to be
several years before the technology's full potential becomes
clear." 160  Unsurprisingly, there currently exists no
comprehensive black letter blockchain regulation. The
application that has caught the attention of regulators the
most up to this point is Bitcoin, but even there most
regulators-including the Department of Treasury Financial
Crime Enforcement Network-have offered guidance, not
formalized rules. 161 Still, a bevy of statutes do touch on
blockchain technology (albeit indirectly), and are summarized
next to highlight governance gaps and challenges.
Relevant statutes to blockchains include the 1862
Stamp Payments Act, 162 the Securities Act, 163 the Electronic
Funds Transfer Act of 1978,164 and the Bank Secrecy Act,
which features the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to
prevent laundering. 165 However, none of these laws are directly
158 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 122-125 (2006).
159 Cf Kiviat, supra note 9, at 607 ("Blockchain technology is adaptable and
policymakers must view it as such. Regulation designed to mitigate the risks
of such a powerful technology should be encouraged.").
160 The Trust Machine, supra note 19.
161 See Kiviat, supra note 9, at 590.
162 See Matthew Kien-Meng Ly, Coining Bitcoin's "Legal Bits": Examining the
Regulatory Framework for Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies, 27 HARv. J. L. &
TECH. 587, 598-99 (2014).
163 Secs. & Exch. Comm'n v. Shavers, No. 4:13- CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *8
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014).
164 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (2012).
165 See Tsukerman, supra note 87, 1157.
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applicable to the core focus of this Article being the use of
blockchains to enhance cybersecurity of certificate authorities
and critical infrastructure. Point agencies for Bitcoin
regulation have included the FBI, which (temporarily) shut
down Silk Road, a site for trading illicit property using
Bitcoins. 166 The IRS has also gotten involved in both Bitcoin
and blockchain regulation, notably in March 2014 when it
issued a notice stating that the agency would treat Bitcoins as
property, not a currency, in a move creating an array of
complex income tax liabilities. 167 Similarly, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which regulates
commodities futures, arguably has the authority to regulate
Bitcoin price manipulation, which, if accurate, could open up a
slew of regulatory avenues for regulators to explore. 168 And
even the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB)
mission to "make markets for consumer financial products and
services work for Americans" 169 implicates Bitcoin and
blockchain technology; indeed, the CFPB has already issued a
consumer advisory statement" in Bitcoins in August 2014
warning the public about the risks. 170
Some states, such as New York, have gone further. New
York in particular has required the placement of certain
cybersecurity safeguards in blockchain applications in the
name of consumer protection under the BitLicense scheme,
increasing the cost of compliance to market entrants and
prompting some firms at least to leave the New York market. 171
Californian officials, particularly within the Department of
Business Oversight, have also decided that state law applies to
crypto-currencies like Bitcoin. 172
More innovation is happening globally with a variety of
nations moving to regulate blockchain applications including
Bitcoin, as seen in the European Union's 2015 decision to
recognize Bitcoin as a currency referenced in Part 1.173 yet
166 Id. at 1158.
167 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS VIRTUAL CURRENCY GUIDANCE: VIRTUAL
CURRENCY IS TREATED AS PROPERTY FOR U.S. FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES; GENERAL
RULES FOR PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS APPLY (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Virtual-Currency-Guidance
[https://perma.ce/S9AD-42WN].
168 Tsukerman, supra note 87, at 1161.
169 About Us, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/YLM8-XS47].
170 Tsukerman, supra note 87, at 1161.
171 Id. at 1163.
172 See Michael B. Marois & Carter Dougherty, California Says State Law
Grants Right to Oversee Bitcoin, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2014 4:28 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-04/california-says-state-law-grants-
right-to-oversee-Bitcoin.html [https://perma.ce/97Q3-9Z5L].
173 The Trust Machine, supra note 19.
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such multi-jurisdictional regulation also raise enforcement
challenges given that a policy imposed by one stakeholder-
such as New York-may conflict with another, potentially
leading to a forked chain as discussed in Part 1.2.3. In such an
instance, some jurisdictions could elect to ban the technology,
which in the U.S. context could lead to First Amendment issues
given that code has already been defined as speech. 174 Another
potential scenario would be judges issuing rulings that,
perhaps inadvertently, cause such hard forks, such as by
ordering that one transaction be approved over another
conflicting one. 175 But black letter law is just the beginning of
blockchain regulation, which, after all, does quite a bit to
regulate itself. After all, it is the inherent self-correcting
"security of the system" that "makes the blockchain
revolutionary." 176
Taking a broader view, blockchain regulation is
happening at various levels and through various modalities
beyond black letter law, including, to use Professor Lawrence
Lessig's nomenclature, norms, markets, and code, 177 as well as
self-regulation, and multilateral collaboration, all of which can
contribute to enhancing critical infrastructure cybersecurity
through blockchains. For example, best practices developed by
blockchain technology providers-such as Ethereum, discussed
in Part 1.3-inform the behavior of peer competitors, and
(depending on uptake) can lead to industry norms and codes of
conduct, which may in turn eventually be codified, as has
happened in the power grid context. Each of these regulatory
approaches has unique benefits and drawbacks, but together
they contribute to a governance regime that is multi-level,
multi-purpose, multi-type, and multi-sectoral in scope and that
could complement the top-down critical infrastructure
governance models favored by certain nations. 178 Next, we dig
174 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER WOLF, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT: TEXT,
HISTORY, AND CASELAW 1053-55 (2003); Scott J. Shackelford et al.,
iGovernance: The Future of Multi-Stakeholder Internet Governance in the
Wake of the Apple Encryption Saga, UNIV. OF N. CAROLINA J. OF INT L L.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 17 n. 77); Adam Satariano, Apple-FBI
Fight Asks: Is Code Protected as Free Speech?, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Feb. 23,
2016 7:55 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-24/apple-
fbi-fight-asks-is-code-protected-as-free-speech [https://perma.ce/7KS2-D3T8].
175 See, e.g., Primavera de Filippi, A $50MHack Tests the Values of Communities
Run by Code, MOTHERBOARD (July 11, 2016),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/thedao [https://perma.ce/PF86-8QYH].
176 Tsukerman, supra note 87, at 1136 (noting "Security in the Bitcoin protocol is
ensured through 'cryptographic proof,' allowing the parties to deal directly
with each other, rather than through a third party.").
177 See LESSIG, supra note 158, at 124-125.
178 For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond
the New 'Digital Divide': Analyzing the Evolving Role of Governments in
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into the potential of a distributed governance model to match
the distributed technology at the heart of Bitcoin.
3.2 A Primer on Polycentric Governance: From
Polanyi to the Present
It may be easiest to understand polycentric governance
in juxtaposition to the alternative-monocentrism, which is a
political system where the authority to enforce rules is "vested
in a single decision structure that has an ultimate monopoly
over the legitimate exercise of coercive capabilities."179 At its
core-building from important notions of legitimacy, power,
and multiple decision centers-polycentric governance is
concerned with the rule of law. In this manner, the U.S.
constitution has been described as an "experiment in
polycentricity" with federalism being one way to operationalize
the concept. 180 What is it that makes polycentric systems so
special? In short, the capacity for spontaneous self-
correction. 181 In the words of Professor Elinor Ostrom, "a
political system that has multiple centers of power at differing
scales provides more opportunity for citizens and their officials
to innovate and to intervene so as to correct maldistributions of
authority and outcomes. Thus, polycentric systems are more
likely than monocentric systems to provide incentives leading
to self-organized, self-corrective institutional change." 1 82
A key element of polycentricity is this spontaneity,
which to Professor Vincent Ostrom meant that "patterns of
organization within a polycentric system will be self-generating
or self-organizing" in the sense that "individuals acting at all
levels will have the incentives to create or institute appropriate
patterns of ordered relationships." 18 3 What factors are most
important to engender such spontaneous self-correction? Free
entry, and the incentivized enforcement of rules, which are in
turn continually revised. 184 In other words, anyone should be
able to play the game, and even collaborate to change the rules
through orderly means. This requires that procedural (e.g.,
rules for changing rules) and cognitive (understanding of
relationships) preconditions be met. 185 As such, "[i]nstitutional
design, the application of our understanding of rules and
consequences and the conditions that determine their
179 Paul D. Aligica & Viad Tarko, Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and
Beyond, 25 GOVERNANCE 237, 245 (2012).
180 Id.




185 Id. at 247.
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interplay, is part and parcel of spontaneous order and not
inimical to it." 186
The "basic idea" of polycentric governance, according to
Professor Michael McGinnis, is that a group facing a collective
action problem "should be able to address" it in "whatever way
[the members of the group] best see fit."187 This could include
using existing governance structures or crafting new
systems. 188 Polycentric governance regimes that are multi-
level, multi-purpose, multi-type, and multi-sectoral in scope189
could complement existing multi-stakeholder models of
Internet governance, which has enjoyed a more organic
development trajectory. 19 0 Yet this trend is a double-edged
sword with many nations seeking to assert greater control
online, challenging the notion of cyberspace as a commons and
further fracturing governance at a time of increasing cyber
insecurity. 191
Professor Michael Polanyi was an early pioneer in the
field of polycentric governance, recognizing that polycentric
structures are vital for scientific discovery given that the
inherent "freedom is utilized to search for an abstract end goal
(objective truth)." 19 2 In such a polycentric system, ideas of
equity and justice, Polyani argued, may only be crystallized by
a gradual process of trial and error experimentation. 193
Professor Lon Fuller agreed with Polyani's assessment with
regards to polycentrism, arguing that many legal decisions are
in fact polycentric in that they involve multiple "decision
centers and the network of cause and effect relationships is not
186 Id.
187 Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An
Equilibrium Concept and Examples from U.S. Health Care 1, (Ind. Univ.
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis,
Working Paper W11-3, 2011),
http://php.indiana.edu/-meginnis/Beijing core.pdf [https://perma.ce/52SR-
Q3AX].
188 Id. at 1-2.
189 Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the
Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POLY STUD.
J. 163, 171 (2011) (defining "polycentricity" as "a system of governance in
which authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority)
interact to determine the conditions under which these authorities, as well as
the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well
as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes.").
190 See Chapter 1 in SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE
(2014).
191 See Paul Tassi, The Philippines Passes a Cybercrime Prevention Act that
Makes SOPA Look Reasonable, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2012, 8:04 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/10/02/the-philippines-passes-the-
cybercrime-prevention-act-that-makes-sopa-look-reasonable/.
192 Aligica & Tarko, supra note 179, at 238.
193 Id. at 239.
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understood very well." 194 Such a conceptualization of the justice
system highlights, among other issues, the prevalence of
unintended consequences that can frustrate justice seekers,195
unintended consequences that can quickly spread in the
context of a distributed technology like blockchains.
The Ostroms' work on polycentric governance, begun in
the 1960s, was initially centered on questions of metropolitan
governance, but subsequently evolved in two directions-social
theory, and empirical investigations of governance structures.
They challenged the majority view at the time that the
"problem of metropolitan government" was that "the
multiplicity of political units" made effective governance
difficult, if not impossible. 196 To this notion, the Ostroms
contended that "the optimum scale of production is not the
same for all urban public goods and services." 197
The Ostroms argued that coordination in complex
systems is in fact possible through interorganizational
arrangements that "would manifest market-like characteristics
and display both efficiency-inducing and error-correcting
behavior." 198 In other words, by taking a political economy
approach, the Ostroms were able to show that "competition
among public agencies is not necessarily inefficient." 199 Yet the
great leap in governance research was the Ostroms' contention
to test their presumption, "to undertake critical tests where
divergent theories imply contradictory conclusions." 2 00 This was
the birth of empirical, polycentric governance research, the
ramifications of which continue to resonate around the world in
a wide array of contexts to this day.
Among the first propositions studied was the claim that
"the size of the governmental unit affects the output and
efficiency of service provision," in other words, that governance
size matters.201 The Ostroms undertook this work first in
Indianapolis-comparing the performance of smaller police
departments against the larger Indianapolis City Police
Department-before moving on to examine other
municipalities, including Chicago, St. Louis, Grand Rapids, and
194 Id. at 240.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 241.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 242 (quoting Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach
to the Study of Intergovernmental Relations, 359 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 135-137 (1965)).
199 Id.
200 Id. (quoting Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the
Study of Intergovernmental Relations, 359 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
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Nashville. 202 In short, they found that: "The presumption that
economies of scale were prevalent was wrong; the presumption
that you needed a single police department was wrong; and the
presumption that individual departments wouldn't be smart
enough to work out ways of coordinating was wrong." 2 03 On the
whole, "polycentric arrangements with small, medium, and
large departmental systems generally outperformed cities that
had only one or two large departmentS"204 What do police
departments have to do with blockchains? These findings were
an early indication of the power of distributed governance to
build trust in complex systems. But the success of these
systems is not automatic.
In summary, the three main features of polycentric
governance may be described in terms of the: (1) "multiplicity
of decision centers[, which] is analyzed in terms of those
centers' ability to implement their different methods into
practice . . . the presence of autonomous decision-making
layers, and . . . the existence of a set of common/shared
goals;" 2 05 (2) "institutional and cultural framework that
provides the overarching system of rules defining the
polycentric system . . . in terms of whether the jurisdiction of
decision centers is territory based or superimposing, . . .
whether the decision centers are involved in drafting the
overarching rules, . . . whether the rules are seen as useful by
the decision centers (regardless of whether or not they are
involved in their drafting-that is, the alignment between rules
and incentives) and in terms of the nature of the collective
choice aggregating mechanism (market, consensus, or majority
rule);" 206 and (3) "spontaneous order generated by evolutionary
competition between the different decision centers' ideas,
methods, and ways of doing things, [which] is analyzed in
terms of whether there exists free exit, . . . the relevant
information for decision making is public . . . and finally, in
terms of the nature of entry in the polycentric system-free,
meritocratic, or spontaneous." 2 07 To put it another way, the
preconditions for polycentricity include the "active exercise" of
differing preferences that are implemented in the real world,208
as well as "incentives compatibility," meaning that the rules
are considered "useful by the agents subjected to them." 2 09
Equally important is "autonomous decision-making" featuring
202 Id. at 243.
203 Id.
204 Id
205 Id. at 254.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 255.
209 Id. at 256.
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"overlapping decision centers."2 10 Together, this literature,
although based on a relatively small number of cases, enjoys a
potentially wide application, 2 11 a topic illustrated in Figure 8,
which shows some 288 differing polycentric systems from the
indicators identified. 2 12
Figure 8: Logical Structure of Polycentricity 213
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What does all this mean in terms of predicting when
polycentric systems may fail? In particular, the model suggests
that this may indeed happen when: (1) The "[m]ultiplicity of
decision centers breakdown due to the system becoming
hierarchical or when the desired goal is achieved";214 (2) The
"[o]verarching system of rules breakdown" due to, for example,
the rules no longer being considered useful confused;215 and (3)
The central spontaneity criterion breaks down due to, for
example, barriers to entry.216 As applied to blockchains, then,
problems may arise due to either multi-jurisdictional strife or
the undue centralization of regulation, along with related
problems of barriers to entry due possibly to inadequate
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overcome, then it may be possible to "provide a way of
discovering how to improve the functioning of different
configurations and complex social systems by means of drawing
analogies between them. Different complex systems have weak
and strong points. The challenge is how to bring the strong
points from one area into another in order to counter the weak
points." 2 17 One of the ways that polycentric governance is
operationalized is through Ostrom design principles, the topic
we turn to next.
3.3 Building Trust through Blockchains -
Applicability of the Ostrom Design Principles
In her groundbreaking 1990 book Governing the
Commons, Professor Ostrom laid out an informative framework
of eight design principles for the effective management of
CPRs. 218 These principles were distilled from the common
traits that Ostrom discovered through her meta-analysis of
successful common property regimes. 219 The design principles,
in turn, are helpful in making predictions about the governance
of CPRs under various scenarios, and include the importance
of: (1) "clearly defined boundaries for the user pool . . . and the
resource domain"; 220 (2) "proportional equivalence between
benefits and costs"; 2 2 1 (3) "collective choice arrangements"
ensuring "that the resource users participate in setting . . .
rules";222 (4) "monitoring ... by the appropriators or by their
agents"; 223 (5) "graduated sanctions" for rule violators; 224 (6)
"conflict-resolution mechanisms [that] are readily available,
low cost, and legitimate"; 225 (7) "minimal recognition of rights
to organize"; 226 and (8) "governance activities [being] . . .
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises." 22 7 Not all of
Professor Ostrom's design principles are applicable to
217 Id. at 260.
218 See ELINOR OsTRoM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 90 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North
eds., 1990).
219 See Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of
Complex Economic Systems 408, 422 (Nobel Prize Lecture, 2009),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2009/ostromlecture.pdf.
220 SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 32 (1998).
221 See OSTROM, supra note 219.




226 Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a
Diversity of Organizations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS: ANALYTICAL
AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES INVOLVING A DIVERSITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 105,
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blockchains. However, some do have salience, and are
addressed in turn to inform a discussion of appropriate policy
responses to global collective action problems.
3.3.1 Defined Boundaries
According to Professor Ostrom, "The boundary rules
relate to who can enter, harvest, manage, and potentially
exclude others' impacts. Participants then have more
assurance about trustworthiness and cooperation of the others
involved." 228 This design criterion could be applied to
blockchain developers in different ways depending on whether
one is considering a fully public, transparent distributed
ledger, or a private blockchain internal to a particular firm or
industry. If the latter, then the members of the group would
need to be vetted since, once inside, they could have unfettered
access to everything recorded on the register.
3.3.2 Proportionality
This design principle underscores the need for equity in
a system so that some of the "users [do not] get all the benefits
and pay few of the costs . . . ."229 This principle evokes debate
over the core question about how best equity should be
encouraged in blockchain platforms. In some ways, blockchains
could be seen as encouraging greater equity by enhancing
transparency, user participation, and rewarding contributions
with fees. This may be especially true in redesigned platforms
that do not require as much computing power as the Bitcoin
blockchain, though this may further increase the need for
trusted systems. 2 30 More generally, the equity criterion speaks
to the importance of ensuring that the benefits of blockchains
are widely distributed beyond sophisticated multinational
firms, a process that could eventually require training
programs as new products and even governmental services are
rolled out.
3.3.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements and Minimal
Recognition of Rights
Professor Ostrom's third design principle states "that
most of the individuals affected by a resource regime are
authorized to participate in making and modifying the rules
228 Id. at 119.
229 Id. at 120.
230 The Trust Machine, supra note 19.
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related to boundaries, assessment of costs . . . , etc."231 This
principle implies the importance of engaged and proactive
rulemaking by technical communities, the private sector, and
the international community.2 32 Such a multi-stakeholder
approach is part and parcel of how the Bitcoin blockchain has
been developed, and is continuously fixed as new bugs are
found and exploits created as was discussed in Part 1.2. It will
be imperative to copy the success of this program, while
ensuring that even broader, non-technical sections of the
citizenry are involved with discussions of blockchain
governance best practices to avoid situations in which the
better off make the rules. This happens in the Bitcoin context,
for example, when those with all the Bitcoins on the system
make the rules on hard-forks, as was discussed in Part 1.2.3.
3.3.4 Monitoring
According to Professor Elinor Ostrom, trust can
typically only do so much to mitigate rule-breaking behavior. 2 33
Eventually, some level of monitoring becomes important. In
self-organized communities, typically monitors are chosen
among the members to ensure "the conformance of others to
local rules." 2 34 However, in the cyber context verification
becomes difficult, to say the least. But again, this is something
that especially public blockchain technologies do exceedingly
well. Instead of relying on external authorities such as CAs or a
small number of entities to patrol errant behavior, given that
the public ledger is transparent and distributed for public
blockchains, anyone can act as a monitor, a form of private
attorney general of the kind used to enforce certain
environmental laws.235
3.3.5 Graduated Sanctions and Dispute Resolution
Other insights from Professor Ostrom's principles such
as the need for graduated sanctions for rule violators and
effective dispute resolution speak to the importance of
addressing legal ambiguities and establishing norms of
behavior. The former point underscores the significance of not
231 Ostrom, supra note 226, at 120.
232 See George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Law as a Source of Strategic
Advantage: Using Proactive Law for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J.
641, 656-57 (2010) (discussing the origins of the proactive law movement,
which may be considered "a future-oriented approach to law placing an
emphasis on legal knowledge to be applied before things go wrong.").
233 Ostrom, supra note 226, at 120.
234 Id at 121.
235 See, e.g., Henry Cohen, Awards of Attorneys'Fees by Federal Courts and
Federal Agencies, in LAW AND ECONOMIC ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 253, 257
(Gerald M. Kessler, ed., 2008).
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"[1]etting an infraction pass unnoticed," 236 meaning that the
cost of flouting cyber norms need to be recognized through
some combination of market reaction and governmental action.
This would be especially important if blockchains are widely
deployed in the critical infrastructure context, given how vital
these services are to the continued functioning of the global
economy. Yet anonymity of blockchain applications like Bitcoin
could exacerbate these challenges.
3.3.6 Nested Enterprises
As stated by Professor Ostrom, "[w]hen common-pool
resources that are being managed by a group are part of a
larger set of resource systems, an eighth design principle is
usually present in robust systems. The nested enterprise
principle states that governance activities are organized in
multiple layers of related governance regimes." 2 37 Blockchains
fit within this definition of nested enterprises in that they
feature multiple layers, represented by hashes, that have the
added bonus of a temporal feature, allowing anyone to track
transactions, and for that matter how norms themselves have
evolved over time. This technology, consequently, provides an
opportunity for the study of temporal norm development within
the cybersecurity context across numerous platforms in the
critical infrastructure context and beyond. Further study is
needed in this regard.
3.3.7 Summary
As helpful as Ostrom's design principles are to
analyzing the factors necessary to create a functioning system
of polycentric governance to conceptualize governance and
build trust in distributed systems like blockchains, they are far
from perfect, as Professor Ostrom would be the first to admit. 2 38
There are, for example, gridlock concerns along with moral and
political problems in play, including an application of Garrett
Hardin's "lifeboat ethics." 2 39 Though Professor Ostrom's
important work on the principles, along with the Institutional
Analysis and Design (IAD) Framework, often gets much of the
236 Ostrom, supra note 226, at 121.
237 Id. at 122.
238 See Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global
Challenges, 284 Sci. 278, 282 (1999) (noting that some of her work in the
global commons context to "provide starting points for addressing future
challenges.").
239 Garrett Hardin, Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor,
PSYCHOL. TODAY, Sept. 1974, at 800 (examining, from an ethical viewpoint,
when swimmers surrounding a lifeboat should be taken aboard).
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attention in public policy circles given its emphasis on self-
understanding beyond classical rational choice rather than
black letter law, 2 4 0 her work on the Social-Ecological-Systems
(SES) Framework beginning in approximately 2007 offers an
even more "comprehensive approach to the study of closely-
coupled systems" drawing from both social and ecological
factors. 24 1 Still, though, running throughout her work is an
empirical demonstration that "public services can be most
efficiently provided under a system of multiple and overlapping
jurisdictions . . . ."242 New blockchains startups should be aware
of the key findings of both bodies of literature summarized
next. After all,"[p]olycentricity can be utilized as a conceptual
framework for drawing inspiration not only from the market
but also from . . . other complex system incorporating the
simultaneous functioning of multiple centers of governance and
decision making with different interests, perspectives, and
values."243
3.4 Implications for Managers and Policymakers
The promise of blockchain technology has expansive
applications across a range of cybersecurity sectors, including
in the CA and critical infrastructure context, as has been
explored throughout this Article. The implications on
organizational decision-making are manifold, ranging from the
way that ledgers are created and transactions recorded, to new
product lines designed to build trust in insecure systems.
Managing the risks and rewards presented by such a
disruptive pivot point presents numerous opportunities and
challenges for managers and policymakers alike, some of which
are discussed here beginning with the private sector before
moving on to extending our analysis to related arenas such as
the burgeoning Internet of Things.
The widespread use of blockchains will inevitably mean
business disruption. After all, all businesses-and indeed
entire industries that are now in the "trust business"-will
need to adapt, or otherwise remake themselves. 244 For example,
blockchains could be further tailored, such as by rolling out
new rules such as transactions only being cleared if they are
endorsed by multiple parties. 2 4 5 Institutional memory would be
240 Michael D. McGinnis, Elinor Ostrom: Politics as Problem-Solving in
Polycentric Settings, in ELINOR OSTROM AND THE BLOOMINGTON SCHOOL OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 281, 285, 292 (Daniel H. Cole & Michael D. McGinnis
eds., 2014).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 286.
243 Id. at 260.
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a organizations for firms of all sizes deploying blockchains. As
with Napster and P2P file sharing, this type of evolution takes
time, but such experimentation in the name of building trust is
at the heart of the polycentric governance literature, and is
squarely in line with the needs of critical infrastructure
providers to secure their systems. The same goes for an array
of governmental services, which could, if the myriad benefits of
blockchain technology are in fact realized, handle most major
life events-from a birth certificate, to a marriage license,
property deed, and even a death certificate-with minimal
human interference. 2 4 6 However, there are also limitations to
this technology, as are summarized below.
At a higher level, the history of finance would be an
open book, potentially being a boon to sustainability and the
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) movement. Indeed,
sustainability may well be a useful paradigm to explore for
lessons that could be imported to enhance the prospects for
successful blockchain governance. There is a growing body of
work investigating, for example, intersections between the
green movement, cybersecurity, and Internet governance,
including the applicability of international environmental law
principles to such collective action problems as information
pollution.247 Similarly, an underappreciated overlap occurs in
the blockchain context by considering the literature on
software ecology and ecosystems with blockchain governance
best practices. In this vein, Bitcoin itself could be considered a
common pool resource in that the public is contributing the
resource in terms of time and computing power to create and
transact Bitcoins, with governance of the system being
distributed and shared globally.248 Such common pool resources
are exhaustible, and are managed through a property regime in
which enforcing the exclusion of a "defined user pool" can be
difficult. 2 4 9 Common examples of common pool resources
246 Id.
247 See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort, & Danuvasin Charoen,
Sustainable Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the Green Movement to
Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1995; Scott J. Shackelford, On
Climate Change and Cyber Attacks: Leveraging Polycentric Governance to
Mitigate Global Collective Action Problems, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
653(2016).
248 See SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 2-5 (1998)
(explaining that common pool resources implicate property rights and are
defined as "subtractable resources managed under a property regime in
which a legally defined user pool cannot be efficiently excluded from the
resource domain").
249 Id. at 5; see also Joseph S. Nye Jr., Cyber Power, HARV. BELFER CTR. 15
(2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf
[https://perma.ce/D8VZ-EXB8] (making the case that cyberspace may be
considered a type of common pool resource, and as such 'self-organization is
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include some fisheries, pastures, and forests. What do fisheries
have to do with cybersecurity? The difficulties of enforcement
and overuse bind these areas together, while similar issues of
scale (such as the size and number of Bitcoin transactions) echo
in other commons arenas. However, Bitcoin and its underlying
blockchain technology may similarly have insights that could
be applied toward enhancing the governance of other classic
common pool resources. Communities could learn from the
power of blockchain technology to register users (or even job
candidateS 250) and keep track of transactions, allowing, for
example, the ability to recognize and trace complex common
property relationships without the need for state
intervention. 2 51
A further area that deserves deeper exploration,
especially in the legal literature, is the application of
blockchain technology to Internet of Things applications. There
is a great deal of buzz surrounding the Internet of Things (loT),
which is the notion, simply put, that nearly everything not
currently connected to the Internet, from gym shorts to
streetlights soon will be. 2 52 The rise of "smart products" such as
Internet-enabled refrigerators and self-driving cars holds the
promise to revolutionize business and society. Applications are
seemingly endless, and embrace an array of consumer
products, including toasters. 253 As stated by Dan and Alex
Tapscott, "[h]ow about these billions of connected smart things
that will be sensing, responding, sharing data, generating and
trading their own electricity, protecting our environment,
managing our homes and our health? And this Internet of
Everything will need a Ledger of Everything."254 Regardless of
possible under certain conditions."').
250 See Kinni, supra note 93 ("Companies like ConsenSys are developing identity
systems where job prospects or prospective contractors will program their
own personal avatars to disclose pertinent information to employers. They
can't be hacked like a centralized database can. Users are motivated to
contribute information to their own avatars because they own and control
them, their privacy is completely configurable, and they can monetize their
own data. This is very different from, say, Linkedln, a central database
owned, monetized, and yet not entirely secured by a powerful corporation.").
251 For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford, Neither Magic Bullet Nor
Lost Cause: Land Titling and the Wealth of Nations, 21 NYU ENVTL. L. J. 272
(2014).
252 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL Y 341, 348 (2015); Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things
is Far Bigger than Anyone Realizes, WIRED (Nov. 2014),
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/
[https://perma.ce/V3UZ-JBD8].
253 See Richard Baguley & Colin McDonald, Appliance Science: The Internet of
Toasters (and Other Things), CNET (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://www.cnet.com/news/appliance-science-the-internet-of-toasters-and-
other-things/ [https://perma.ce/9CV9-6B55].
254 Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 1.
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whether this is, in fact, necessary, the potential for blockchains
to aid in securing this range of systems requires further
unpacking and research surrounding interlinked governance
best practices.
The downsides of blockchain technology also need to be
carefully considered, least of which is the fact that-in a public
blockchain-everything is public, forever. 255 This recalls
debates over the "right to be forgotten," raising the specter of
regulation, which could, in turn, be ineffective if its domestic
share of the global blockchain was less than fifty percent of
available computing power. Other outstanding issues also
deserve consideration from managers and policymakers alike,
including longevity and governance. As such, it should be clear
that, despite their power, blockchains are not a panacea. For
example, despite ongoing concerns about the security of the
U.S. election system, including pervasive vulnerabilities on
voting machines run by thousands of jurisdictions across the
country, 256 the utility of blockchain technology to make
democracy harder to hack is limited.A national election with
significant national security implications would be a rapid
target for criminal organizations and nation states. If any one
group-or some combination of these groups-were to achieve
more than fifty percent of the computing power on the
blockchain, they could tamper with the results.257 Further,
introducing millions of voters to blockchain technology-and
creating a system robust enough to scale upward-would raise
significant technical challenges.258
Still, if privacy concerns and other considerations are
overcome, the benefits of blockchain technology are indeed
immense. Indeed, the goals of blockchain proponents are
"laudable," including "speed, lower cost, security, fewer errors,
and the elimination of central points of attack and failure." 2 59
Consequently, although such a future will doubtless intimidate
or otherwise cause some consternation across various
stakeholders, given declining trust in both public and private-
255 Kinni, supra note 93.
256 See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Opinion: How to Make Democracy Harder to




257 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of
hacking a blockchain by accumulating more than fifty percent of the
computer power in the distributed network).
258 For more on this topic, see Sunoo Park & Ronald L. Rivest, Towards Secure
Quadratic Voting (2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://people.csail.mit.edu/sunoo/p/l7/qv.pdf [http://perma.ce/C9EK-K7ZX].
259 Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 8.
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sector institutions,2 60 any effort to build transparency, reduce
costs, and improve security will likely be welcomed by the
majority.
CONCLUSION
To many, the notion of blockchains and distributed
ledgers is the stuff of cocktail-party conversation stoppers.
Other similar innovations, from double-entry bookkeeping or
joint-stock companies, can also solicit a shrug-though it
should be noted that some scholars have argued that these
inventions "enabled the rise of capitalism and the nation-
state."2 6 1 But, as with these earlier practices, blockchains have
the potential to, simply put, "transform how people and
businesses co-operate." 262 Such an outcome is by no means pre-
determined with an array of technological, economic, political,
and governance issues to be overcome; 263 still, the promise of
this technology, especially in the context of enhancing
cybersecurity in CAs and related critical infrastructure
systems, deserves our sustained attention. 264 In other words, a
sustainable blockchain edifice will not be built overnight, it will
take ongoing attention by numerous stakeholders-including
policymakers-over a period of years, perhaps decades. But by
starting now, block by block, we can build trust in an age that
has to date been defined by increasing cyber insecurity.
260 See Jim Norman, Americans' Confidence in Institutions Stays Low, GALLUP
(June 13, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/192581/americans-confidence-
institutions-stays-low. aspx [http://perma.ce/ZN6B-FK6C].
261 Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 8.
262 The Trust Machine, supra note 19.
263 See, e.g., Ben Dickson, Before you Invest in a Blockchain Startup, Read This,
VENTURE BEAT (Dec. 10, 2016), http://venturebeat.com/2016/12/10/before-you-
invest-in-a-blockchain-startup-read-this [http://perma.ce/2YER-9DTQ].
264 Other related arenas in which blockchain technology could enhance
distributed trust include the supply chain for digital goods, hashes for
software distributions and patches, and potentially even a distributed ledger
to promote confidence in "real" news. See, e.g., Michael Casey & Oliver
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APPENDIX A: A SHORT INTERLUDE INTO CRYPTOGRAPHY
This Appendix briefly lays out some of the relevant
cryptographic principles underlying blockchain technology,
beginning with hash functions before moving on to digital
signatures and Bitcoin transactions.
Hash Functions
A function is simply a map of objects in one set, called
the domain, to another set of objects, called the range. For
example, a primary school function f(x)=x+4 is another way of
mapping numbers to other numbers. We denote this by writing
f:N-* N, to show that the function maps integers to integers, or
f:R-* R to compare real numbers to real numbers. A function
that maps a large, possibly infinite, set of objects to a smaller
set of objects is called a hash function. For example, a function
g(x)=[ x/2J, divides x by 2, and rounds down to the nearest
integer. When we constrain the domain and range of g as
follows, g:{1,2, . . . ,12}-{1,2 . . . ,6}, this becomes a hash
function that maps the integers between 1 and 12, the range, to
integers between 1 and 6, the domain. Since the domain is
larger than a range it is a hash function. For any elements x #
x' for which g(x)=g(x'), we say that x and x' collide, or that there
is a collision. Note that by the Pigeon Hole Principle, 2 65 all
hash functions have collisions.
Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographers are interested in hash functions with
specific properties, which are too technical to present formally
here, so instead we will focus on the high-level intuition. Two
properties of interest for the immediate purposes are pseudo-
randomness and collision resistance, which are two properties
that together allow cryptographers to treat the hash function
as a Random-Oracle. To aid in the explanation, it helps to have
a specific hash function in mind. The one used in Bitcoin is the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
cryptographically approved hash function SHA256, where
SHA256:{0,1}* {O,1}.266 That is, it maps any finite binary
265 The Pigeon Hole Principle states that if you have a set of n objects, mapped to
a set of m containers n>m, then there are at least two objects mapped to the
same container. The concept is helpful when dealing with finite sets.
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string (denoted {0,1}*) to a binary string of length 256 bits
(denoted {0,1}256). Further, for the discussion that follows, the
size of the range is 2256, which is truly an astronomically large
number: there are estimated to be "only" approximately 2267
atoms in the observable universe. 267
A hash-function is pseudo-random when given a random
input x of a fixed size (say 256 bits) that is unknown to an
efficient adversary, and the output is indistinguishable from a
truly random outcome to the same adversary. For example, the
output of the
SHA256(x) I ISHA562(xI 11)1 1 SHA256(x I 111) 1 SHA256(xI II
11)1 I . . . hash appears random to an efficient adversary that
does not know x, but which has full knowledge of the hash
function SHA256. Here, an efficient adversary can be
considered someone that has access to a large multiple of global
computing power and potentially decades of time.2 68 In other
words, hash functions enjoy the potential for high security
absent dedicated, and resource-intensive, attempts to crack
them. Yet, it is not unreasonable to suggest that there may be
more efficient approaches for cyber attackers to exploit. Let us
delay a brief discussion of this topic until the end of section.
A hash function is collision resistant if it is
computationally infeasible for an efficient adversary to find
collisions in the hash functions. Now since all hash functions
have collisions, the question is can one efficiently find them? In
fact, SHA256 has an infinite number of collisions, and yet no
one can find any two binary strings x# x' such that
SHA256(x)=SHA256(x'). Again, since there are an infinite
number of collisions, an attacker can find one by starting to
compute SHA256 on the sequence of all binary strings:
SHA256(0), SHA256(1), SHA256(00), SHA256(01), etc., until a
collision is found. However, because of the pseudo-random
property above, we expect the outputs of SHA256 to simulate a
uniformly random distribution on the set {0, 1}256,
mathematically we expect this approach to take 2128 iterations,
due to the birthday paradox. 269 Again, assuming even vast
267 See 10 Times More Galaxies!, NASA,
http://nasa.tumblr.com/post/151753781974/10-times-more-galaxies (last
visited Nov. 15, 2016) [http://perma.ce/DYN5-XHHQ]; John Carl Villanueva,
How Many Atoms Are There in the Universe?, UNIVERSE TODAY (Dec. 24,
2015), http://www.universetoday.com/36302/atoms-in-the-universe
[http://perma.ce/CUS4-2X2A].
268 Note that in theory an inefficient adversary that had no limits on time, could
distinguish the output from random by checking to see if the output sequence
results from each possible input string of length 256 bits, by enumerating the
output of the above function over all possible binary strings of length 256,
and seeing if there is a match. However, this would require an expected 2255
attempts, which even by our generous standards of computation, is an
astronomical amount of time.
269 The Birthday Paradox comes from the fact that collisions in randomly
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computational resources and huge amounts of time, this
approach is similarly inefficient.
In both above cases, we can show that brute-force
algorithmic approaches could discern a string was not random,
or could produce a collision, yet these techniques are inefficient
for attackers since they take an astronomically long time. Yet,
in both cases one might argue that if one knew specific
information about the hash functions, and was clever, then a
more efficient algorithm could greatly speed up this process.
For example, if we consider the function g(x)=[ x/2J again, it is
trivial to find collisions: x and x+1 for any even number x are
collisions, and it is not at all dependent on the size of the
domain or range of the function g. Here, we must note that
while it is believed there are algorithms that do better than the
brute force approach, they are not believed to do much better.
That hash functions with these properties can be built is based
on beliefs about computational theory, but ultimately these
properties cannot be proved outright, as doing so would require
solving one of the largest open questions in mathematics, the
infamous P vs NP problem. 270
Cryptographers use a useful heuristic when thinking
about cryptographic hash functions such as SHA2, which they
call the Random Oracle Model.271 This model is known to be
mathematically incorrect in some cases, yet despite this fact it
seems to predict hash functions well enough in the cases
cryptographers are interested in to be useful without having
negative security consequences. 272 In the Random Oracle
model, we treat the hash function SHA256:{O, 1}* {O, 1}256 as a
completely random function with no structure. That is, for each
input x, SHA256(x) is chosen to be the result of 256 random
coin tosses (where, say, heads represents 0, and tails
represents 1). A random oracle of this form is truly random
distributed events are much more likely than most people's intuition would
suspect. In particular, the probability that anyone in a room of twenty-three
people has the same birthday as you is quite low, about six percent, but the
probability that any two people in such a room share the same birthday is
about fifty percent. With just seventy people in the room, the odds of a shared
birthday is 99.9 percent. See ANTOINE Joux, ALGORITHMIC CRYPTANALYSIS 185
(2009).
270 The P vs NP problem is considered to be one of the largest open questions in
mathematics. It is believed to be unsolvable with current mathematical
approaches, has a $1-million-dollar bounty for a solution, is one of the Clay
Math Institute's ten Millennium Problems, and is even the focus of a major
motion picture. See generally LANCE FORTNOW, THE GOLDEN TICKET: P, NP,
AND THE SEARCH FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE (2013).
271 See DARIO CATALANO ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CRYPTOGRAPHY 137 (2006)
(describing the Random Oracle Model).
272 In particular, the model is widely accepted to produce secure results for
standard cryptographic protocols, and not one specifically designed to show
flaws with the system.
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(and thus satisfies the pseudo-randomness property) and
collision resistant. For the remainder of this Article, we will
treat SHA256 as a random oracle.
Proofs-of-Work
Proofs-of-work are a fundamental technology underlying
blockchains. Their basic goal is to allow one party to prove to
another that they have spent a certain amount of time working
on a given problem, and were invented by Professors Cynthia
Dwork and Moni Naor. 273 This may sound abstract and difficult
to accomplish, but there is a simple real-world analogy.
Suppose we want you to commit so much time to working on
something, then one technique is that we can send you a box
with a jig-saw puzzle in it, but without a guiding picture, and
then ask you, as proof of your work, to send us back a picture of
the constructed puzzle. The assembly of the puzzle is
something that can be done but it takes effort. The more pieces,
the more uniform the picture, and the less hint of what the
final picture is, the longer it will take you.
To cryptographically achieve this same concept, we are
going to ask you to find the output of a cryptographic hash
function with certain properties. In order to ensure freshness,
and that you are actually solving work for the request at hand,
we will be able to specify a string to the proof; this string is
essentially the analogue to the specific picture used for the
jigsaw analogy. Thus, if we want a user to proof she's done
work with respect to a named string y, we will ask that she find
us any string x, such that its output begins with i zeros, as
shown below:
SHA256(y||x) = 0 102 ... Oj i zerosbi+i ... b 25 6 -
Note that in the above example bi denotes any value of bit.
Thus, to complete a proof-of-work on a string y, one iterates
through values of x, computing SHA256(y I I x) until such time
as the output begins with i zeros. Further note that we can
vary the amount of work that needs to be done by varying the
value i. In particular, if we assume the Random Oracle model,
then the expectation is that each output bit of SHA256 for a
given unique input string y IIx is chosen uniformly at random,
and thus the probability that such a string begins with i zeros
is 2-i. Therefore, to find an appropriate x, we expect to have to
iterate through 2i possible choices. To comprehend this proof,
273 Cynthia Dwork & Moni Naor, Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk
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though, and its implications for blockchain cybersecurity, it is
necessary to dive briefly into digital signatures.
Digital Signatures
Digital signatures provide the digital equivalent of a
signature for contracts, and include the added security
functionality of being non-forgeable. 2 7 4 In their simplest form,
digital signatures consist of three algorithms, a key generation
algorithm, a signing algorithm, and a verification algorithm,
(Gen, Sign, Verify) respectively. 2 7 5 The signing key may be
thought of as the key to a safe that contains a signing stamp.
Anyone who has the key can retrieve the signing stamp and
use it to "sign" the signature of the individual whose name is
on the stamp; hence the need to keep it secret.
The signing algorithm takes a message M, and a singing
key SignKey, and generates a signature o, denoted o--
Sign(SignKey,M). Extending our analogy, this corresponds to
using the key to unlock the safe and to stamp the document
containing the message. Unlike this analogy, though, the
signature produced is a string that binds the specific message
M to the signing key, such that only someone with the
verification key can check that that the signer did in fact sign
the message. It is computationally infeasible for anyone not
possessing the Signing Key to forge a signature and come up
with a new signature o', regardless of how many pairs of valid
signature message pairs (Mi,oi) they have seen.
The verification algorithm takes a message M,
verification key VerifyKey, and a signature o, and returns true
if the signature o truly was generated by applying the Signing
algorithm with the message M, and the appropriate signing
key, SignKey, (i.e., ow--Sign(SignKey,M)), and false otherwise.
It is used for verification, with significant applications for the
peer-to-peer networks at the heart of blockchains.
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Network
Peer-to-peer networks, while not cryptographic, are a
key component of modern blockchains. A peer-to-peer (P2P)
network is simply an overlay network on the Internet in which
there is no central authority that regulates it, and where
clients of the network communicate directly with one another.
Despite the lack of central coordination, the network provides
274 See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN),
Pub. L. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464, enacted June 30, 2000, 15 U.S.C. ch. 96.
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services that appear to come from a singular source. Thus each
computer on the network has both client and host functions. 276
Popular examples of P2P networks include the BitTorrent file
sharing protocol, which allows people to transfer files to and
from other computers on the network without a centralized
authority having a list of all the participants or available
files. 2 7 7 Such networks became popularized after the initial file
sharing network Napster was taken down, resulting in the rise
of various P2P networks that have proven largely immune to
attempts to disable them, with the Silk Road saga being a case
in point. 2 7 8
276 See CHWAN-HWA (JOHN) WU & J. DAVID IRWIN, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER
NETWORKS AND CYBERSECURITY 188 (2016).
277 See JONAS ANDERSSON SCHWARZ, ONLINE FILE SHARING: INNOVATIONS IN MEDIA
CONSUMPTION 132 (2013).
278 See, e.g., Patrick Howell O'Neill, Meet OpenBazaar, the Black Market That's
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